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Regulatory Reform:  The New Lochnerism? 
 
In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,1 cost-benefit analysis (CBA) proponents 
urged the Supreme Court to strike down section 109 of the Clean Air Act2 under a constitutional 
doctrine not used since the end of the Lochner-era, the nondelegation doctrine, or to create a 
canon of statutory construction favoring CBA to avoid the nondelegation issue.  Their argument 
for a cost-benefit canon portrayed regulation aiming to protect public health as irrational, 
because of the one-sidedness of the health protection principle.3  By asking the Court to base its 
ruling on its views of the reasonableness of section 109’s health protection principle, they 
sought, in essence, to revive an approach that prevailed during the Lochner period, when the 
Court discredited itself by using dubious substantive due process theories to strike down 
regulatory schemes that it found unreasonable.4  Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe 
implicitly recognized that some of the CBA proponents’ arguments sounded in Lochnerism, for 
his brief for General Electric disclaimed any reliance on substantive due process to avoid the 
taint emanating from the Lochner line of cases.5  
                                                 
 1  531 U.S. 457 (2001) 
 2 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000).  
 3  See, e.g., Brief of General Electric as Amicus Curiae in Support of Cross-Petitioners at 22, 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1426) (arguing that administrative decisions that do 
not take costs and risk trade-offs into account are not reasoned); Brief of Respondents Appalachian Power Company 
et al. in Support of Petitioners at 4, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1426) 
(evaluation of tradeoffs are part of “any sound risk management decision”). 
 4 See infra, notes 237-244 and accompanying text; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW 
123-125 (1988) (explaining that Lochner has become an exemplar of a malfunctioning Supreme Court).  
 5 GE Brief at 18, n. 37 (stating that “it would not necessarily be irrational to the point of 
unconstitutionality for Congress” to preclude agency consideration of cost); Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. 
Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 674-75 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (referring to the “general disrepute” of 
Lochnerism); Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided”:  Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. 
L. REV. 677, 678 (2005) (both academics and judges until quite recently treated Lochner as a “central” example “of 
how courts should not decide constitutional cases”).  Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  
1362 (2000) (suggesting that that wholesale abandonment of substantive due process review may be unfortunate, 
even if Lochner itself is problematic).  The author’s brief for the United States Public Interest Research Group 
(USPIRG) Education Fund in the American Trucking case addressed many of Professor Tribe’s arguments for GE.  
This Article expresses the author’s opinion, not that of the USPIRG Education Fund. 
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The CBA proponents deployed these arguments for Lochnerian activism attacking Clean 
Air Act section 109,6 which requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate 
national ambient air quality standards protecting public health.  This provision reflects a specific 
value choice, favoring public health protection over competing economic considerations.7  
Accordingly, the American Trucking Court held that enactment of section 109 did not violate the 
nondelegation doctrine, which prohibits Congressional delegation of legislative authority.8  The 
Court also rejected CBA proponents’ request to construe section 109 to require consideration of 
cost.9  In essence, the Court’s decision recognized that the Constitution does not prohibit one-
sided legislation.10   
This article examines a question suggested by Professor Tribe’s brief.  To what extent 
does modern regulatory reform rely upon Lochnerian views of legislation?  The diversity of 
scholarly views about what precisely Lochnerism was about makes this question difficult to 
answer.11  One frequently lamented Lochnerian vice, judicial misinterpretation of the 
Constitution, has played at most a very minor role in the regulatory reform debate.  Yet, 
Lochnerian views about legislation, which played an important role in that period’s 
                                                 
 6  42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000).  
 7 See Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Congress deliberately 
decided to subordinate health and feasibility concerns to health protection goals).   
 8 American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474 (finding the “scope of discretion § 109(b)(1) allows well 
within the outer limits” of the Court’s nondelegation doctrine precedent).   
 9 Id. at 464-71.  
 10 This point emerged more clearly in oral argument than in the Court’s written opinion.  American 
Trucking Associations argued that the Court could solve the problem of section 109 being unintelligible by requiring 
EPA to consider costs.   See Christopher H. Schroeder, The Story of American Trucking:  The Blockbuster Case that 
Misfired, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 344 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck, eds. 2005).  This argument 
did not persuade the Court, because, as Justice Scalia said during the oral argument, adding more factors -i.e. 
creating balance - does not “bring more certainty to the statute.”  Id.   The Court’s ruling requires intelligible 
legislative principles, not  legislative neutrality or balance.  
 11 See Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B. U. L. REV. 881, 881-82 
(2005) (describing the shift from looking at Lochnerism as a product of commitment to laissez-faire economics to a 
view of Lochnerism as a set of obstacles to class legislation); David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 373, 374 (2003) (stating that while nearly all agree that Lochner is a “pariah” there is “no consensus on 
why it was wrong”).  
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jurisprudence, play a central role in the regulatory reform debate, as this Article will show.  Both 
the Lochner-era Court and modern regulatory reformers derive their views from economic theory 
with natural law origins.  Both Lochnerism and regulatory reform share skepticism of legislative 
value choices and implicitly embrace the idea that legislation should be neutral.12  The 
skepticism of legislation that both share leads to remarkably similar demands for hyper-
rationality in regulatory decisions.   And both equate CBA with rationality.         
Examining the link between modern regulatory reform and Lochnerism brings the arcane 
regulatory reform debate into a broader constitutional and administrative law context.  
Regulatory reformers’ arguments serve a Lochnerian vision of neutral largely value-free 
legislative decisions.  This article argues that such a view of legislation is out of place in the 
post-Lochner administrative state, as American Trucking implicitly recognized.   
Part one provides relevant background on CBA.  Part two discusses Lochnerism.  Part 
three draws parallels between various aspects of Lochnerism and modern regulatory reform.  Part 
four develops the implications of these parallels for the regulatory reform debate.    
I.  CBA:  An Introduction 
 Calls for regulatory reform have greatly influenced government in recent years.13 
Regulatory reformers have argued that we need much more emphasis on CBA and much less on 
                                                 
 12 Cushman, supra note 11, at 886 (“legal commentators writing about the Lochner era” viewed due 
process doctrine as “suffused with norms of neutrality, equality, and generality.”); Matthew D. Adler, Rational 
Choice, Rational Agenda-Setting, and Constitutional Law:  Does the Constitution Require Basic or Strengthened 
Public Rationality?, in LINKING POLITICS AND LAW (Christoph Engel & Adrienne Heritier eds. 2003) 120 (arguing 
that Congress does not choose values, just actions).   
 13 See Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 34 (1998); Stephen F. 
Williams, Squaring the Vicious Circle, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 257 (2000) (a defense of CBA by a D.C. Circuit judge); 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 202(a), 109 Stat. 64 (codified as amended at 2 
U.S.C. § 1532 (2000)) (requiring CBA of extremely expensive measures); Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes:  
Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1418-19 (2005) (contrasting 
Congressional skepticism toward CBA in the 1960s and 1970s with recent attitudes toward it).  See generally Cass 
R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword:  Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 247, 307 (1996) (concluding that “[t]he regulatory state is becoming something like a cost-benefit state”).   
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health protective policies, like the policy found in section 109 of the Clean Air Act.14  This 
section defines CBA and reviews some of its history.   
 A.  CBA:  A Definition 
 CBA of a proposed rule requires a regulator to compare compliance costs to the harms a 
rule will avoid, which most writers refer to as benefits.15  In order to facilitate this comparison, 
CBA requires the analyst to express the value of the avoided harms in dollar terms to the extent 
possible.16  This analysis of avoided harm requires two steps.  The regulator must undertake a 
quantitative risk assessment to estimate the number of deaths and illnesses and the amount of 
environmental harm a regulation will avoid.17  The regulator must then assign a dollar value to 
each death, habitat saved, illness avoided, etc.18  Using these two steps the regulator can, in 
principle, estimate the value of some of a regulation’s benefits in dollar terms.   
 The first step, quantitative risk assessment, usually proves impossible for all 
environmental effects and many health effects as well.19  Data gaps and a lack of basic scientific 
                                                 
 14 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 308 
(1999) (the Clean Air Act has been subject to “telling criticism” for its failure to balance costs and benefits).  
 15 See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation:  Beyond Administrative 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 560-61 & n. 67 (1997) (distinguishing harm avoidance from benefit 
creation).  
 16 See FRANK ACKERMAN AND LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS:  KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING 
AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING, 39 (2004) (CBA requires reducing benefits of environmental protection to “dollar 
values.”); William H. Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks:  Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 
4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 193 (1980) (defining CBA as a comparison between costs and benefits in dollar 
terms).  Cf. Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies under Environmental Laws, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 
97, 101 (1987) (comparing CBA in the narrow sense employed here with a broader definition of CBA).   
 17  McGarity, supra note 13, at 12 (CBA in the health and environmental context begins with 
quantitative risk assessment). 
 18 Rodgers, supra note 16, at 193 (CBA “seeks to reduce all concerns to a common denominator-the 
dollar”). 
 19 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 
PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM:  2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 13 (2004) (many of the major 
rules OMB has reviewed in the last 10 years “have important non-quantified” benefits and costs).  See, e.g., Amy 
Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species:  Why Less is More in the Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat 
Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 180-183 (2004); Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy 
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understanding often preclude even crude estimation of the amount of death, illness, and 
environmental destruction a particular regulation will avoid.20  When estimation proves possible, 
uncertainties often lead to an enormous range of scientifically plausible benefits estimates.21 
 CBA advocates tend to equate all of this quantification with objectivity.22  But risk 
assessment and monetization require policy decisions in order to extrapolate risk estimates from 
limited data and to assign dollar values to particular consequences.23 
 CBA supporters have varying positions about what role CBA should play in the 
regulatory process. 24 Sometimes they advocate the “indeterminate position,” which simply 
                                                                                                                                                             
Math, 90 GEO. L. J. 2341, 2351-52 (2002) (discussing serious health effects associated with arsenic that EPA could 
not quantify). 
 20 See Richard W. Parker, Grading Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1382, 1389-1400 (2003) 
(providing numerous examples of failure to count non-quantifiable benefits); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT 
STATE:  THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 12 (2002) (“quantification will be . . . impossible in some 
cases.”).  
 21 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L. J. 2255, 2257 (2002) (finding that a 
“benefits range” sometimes proves so “exceedingly wide” that it does little to “discipline judgment”).  
 22  See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 16, at 35 (“. . . cost-benefit analysis presents itself 
as the soul of rationality, an impartial, objective standard for good decisions.”).  See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAHN, 
REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM:  A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 3-4 (2000) (selling cost-benefit analysis by referring 
repeatedly to “a neutral economist’s benefit-cost test”) [emphasis added].  
 23 David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 72 COLO. L. REV. 336,  403-05 (2006).  See 
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 16, at 61-90, 179-203 (identifying and critiquing some of the value choices 
made in monetization); Henry Richardson, The Stupidity of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 971, 972 
(2000) (finding many of the value choices implicit in CBA “stupid”).  See, e.g., Parker, supra note 20, at 1370-75 
(critiquing methodologies used to value life and uses of discount rates); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999) (discussing 
the value choices involved in discounting); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L. J. 1911 (1999) (same) ; 
Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39 (1999) (same); Thomas O. McGarity, 
Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 171 (1983) (arguing that “wage premiums” are not set by willingness to accept risk, 
but by the unemployment rate and the level of desperation of currently employed workers).  Cf. McGarity, supra 
note 19, at 2353-54 (discussing EPA’s failure to adjust death valuations to account for numerous relevant factors); 
Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189 (2000); Armatya Sen, The 
Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 945-47 (2000) (discussing considerations that emphasis 
on “willingness to pay” leaves out); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not so Paradoxical:  The Rationale 
for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L. J. 729, 734-35 (criticizing discounting and use of “wage 
premiums” as basis for dollar estimates of a human life’s value). 
 24 See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Cost of Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation:  
The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 48-49 
(2005) (describing several positions about how to take costs and benefits into account).   
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maintains that regulators should consider CBA.25  This position does not tell us how precisely 
regulators should respond to CBA or what role it should play.26  At other times, however, they 
advocate some sort of cost-benefit criterion, such as a requirement that the costs of a regulation 
not exceed its benefits, which provides somewhat clearer guidance.27  This distinction between 
the indeterminate position and support for a cost-benefit criterion will aid part IV’s analysis.  
 B.  Origins and History 
 The CBA idea comes from economic theory and relies upon an analogy between 
environmental protection and the purchase of goods and services.28  CBA treats government 
regulation as a purchase of a benefit, rather than as an effort to protect people from harm.29  Just 
as a rational consumer purchasing a good or service would not pay more than the benefit is 
worth, economic theory suggests that the government should not write regulations that cause 
society to incur costs that outweigh the environmental and health benefits a regulation will 
bring.30  This analogy between government regulation and purchase decisions leads to a view 
that government agencies should consider CBA when writing regulations.   
 The courts have interpreted the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)31 and the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)32 as requiring application of a cost-benefit 
                                                 
 25  See Driesen, supra note 23, at 342-43 (distinguishing between the “indeterminate position” that 
regulators should consider CBA and the use of a cost-benefit criterion).  See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. 
Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation?  Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 
U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2002) (CBA is a tool and a procedure not a rigid formula to determine outcomes); 
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L. J. 165, 195 (1999) (describing 
CBA as a “decision procedure.”).  
 26 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR 130 (2005) (CBA does not establish a rule governing choices).  
 27 See Driesen, supra note 23, at 394-402 (analyzing various cost-benefit criteria).  See, e.g., Hahn & 
Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1498 (arguing for a presumption against regulation with costs exceeding benefits).  
 28 See Driesen, supra note 15, at 577; WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS:  THE CASE FOR 
OPTIMAL POLLUTION  12 (1974) (arguing for this approach).  
 29 Driesen, supra note 15, at 560 (explaining why a cost-benefit criterion allows harm to continue).  
 30 Id. at 578 (economists assume that citizens would pay no more than a cost reflecting the value of 
the effects of the prevented pollution).  
 31  15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000). 
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approach.33  Most other environmental, health, and safety statutes, however, employ some 
combination of mandates to protect public health and safety (such as the mandate found in 
section 109 of the Clean Air Act)34 and to require reductions achievable through use of 
appropriate technology (i.e. technology-based standards).35   Technology-based standard setting 
provisions, which are ubiquitous in environmental law, require agencies to consider cost, but do 
not contemplate comparing those costs to benefits.36  As a result, regulators crafting technology-
based standards may avoid quantifying benefits.   
 Nevertheless, a series of executive orders has often required CBA, even under statutes 
that do not embrace the technique.37  President Reagan’s executive order had the explicit goal of 
                                                                                                                                                             
 32 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000). 
 33 See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
pesticide registration does not obviate need for a Clean Water Act permit because FIFRA is based on CBA); 
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1257? (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting TSCA to require CBA); Save 
our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that pesticide registration does not eliminate 
need for an environmental impact statement, because “FIFRA registration is a cost-benefit analysis”); Envtl. Def. 
Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1012-18 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (proponent of a pesticide must show that its benefits outweigh 
its risks).  McGarity, supra note 19, at 2343 (identifying cost-benefit balancing as the “core regulatory concept” of 
TSCA and FIFRA); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking:  A Response to Professor 
Seidenfeld, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 525, 541-49 (1997) (critiquing the interpretation of TSCA as imposing a cost-benefit 
test).  Congress, however, amended FIFRA in 1996 to modify the cost-benefit balancing approach for pesticides 
used in food. See Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1513 (codified in scattered 
section of 7 U.S.C. (2000)). 
  Congress has also given CBA a limited role under the most recent Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water 
Act (SDWA).  See SDWA Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-25 (Supp. V 1999)); McGarity, supra note 19, at 2343-44 (analyzing the cost-benefit and 
risk/risk amendments); Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1393 (2002) (explaining the SDWA’s hybrid test). 
 34 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000).  See, e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2000).  
 35 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1316(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 
7411(a)(1), 7412(d), 7503(a)(2), 7475(a)(4). 
 36 See Driesen, supra note 24, at 8-12.   The Federal Water Pollution Control Act’s technology-based 
“best practicable control technology” provisions do require a reasonable relationship between costs and benefits.  
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(B), 1314(b)(1)(B) (2000).  But the courts, following legislative history, have construed 
this requirement as requiring marginal cost effectiveness analysis, rather than a comparison of costs to the dollar 
value of environmental effects.  See id. at 23-24; Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 1980).  
Cf. EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1980) (noting that BTP limitations reflect an agency 
conclusion that the costs imposed on industry are worth the benefits).  See also Bruce La Pierre, Technology-
Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 819-20 (1977) (describing the one 
case to deviate from Pac. Fisheries’ rejection of consideration of ecological benefits as a “major aberration.”).  
 37 See Exec.Order 12,291, § 2, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. §  601 app. at 431-34 
(1982) (requiring that benefits outweigh costs “to the extent permitted by law.”); Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638-
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simply reducing the burden of regulation, an objective in some tension with the aims of the 
Congresses that enacted many of the modern regulatory statutes in the 1970s.38  In keeping with 
the Justice Department’s view that the President could not authorize agencies to “transgress 
boundaries set by Congress,” the order only applies “to the extent permitted by law.”39  The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an office consisting mostly of economists, not 
lawyers,40 administers the cost-benefit executive orders and has used that authority to give CBA 
much greater primacy than environmental, health, and safety statutes call for.41    
 Support for CBA has grown both within government and among academics.  While 
originally the executive orders excited a great deal of angst in Congress, in 1995 Congress 
passed the Unfunded Mandates Act, which generally required its use in considering rules likely 
to generate $100 million or more in costs. 42  Some judges have also expressed support for 
CBA.43 And, in recent years, several very prominent academics have devoted significant 
                                                                                                                                                             
49 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 1995).  For more background on these orders, see Thomas O. 
McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1476-79 (1996). 
 38 Compare E.O. 12,291, Preamble (seeking “to reduce the burdens of existing and future 
regulations. . .”) with 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000).   
 39 See E.O. 12,291 §§ 2, 3(a), 6(a), 7(e); E.O. 12498 § 5; Robert V. Percival, Rediscovering the 
Limits of the Regulatory Review Authority of the Office of Management and Budget, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10017, 10018 (1987).   Furthermore E.O. 12,291 specifies that nothing in the order “shall be construed as 
displacing the agencies’ responsibilities delegated by law.”  E.O. 12,291, §3(f)(3). 
 40 See Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L 
REV. 219, 226 (1994) (noting OMB’s lack of expertise on legal issues).  
 41 See Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting lax agency rule passed 
to satisfy OMB demands); Pub. Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reversing 
agency action crossing out standards at the behest of OMB); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 556, 570 
(D.D.C. 1986) (reversing OMB’s action in delaying rule issuance beyond a statutory deadline); Herz, supra note 40, 
at 219 (“OMB . . . displaced agency decision-making . . “ regarding the content of the Clean Air Act’s operating 
permit rule); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 461 (1987) (stating 
that the executive orders “expressly” recognize the agency’s “ultimate” regulatory authority even if this principle is 
“not followed in practice”); Oliver A Houck, President X and the New (Approved) Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. 
REV.  535, 540 (1987) (OMB has favored deregulation rather than “faithful execution of the laws”); Eric Olson, The 
Quiet Shift of Power:  Office of Management and Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency 
Rulemaking under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES 1, 51 (1984) (explaining that OMB “goes 
beyond the terms of . . . the . . . enabling statute” in exercising its review function). 
 42  Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 202(a), 109 Stat. 64 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (2000)).  
 43 See, e.g., Int’l Union v. Occupational Safety and Health Admin., 938 F.2d 1310, 1319-1321, 1326-
27 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  
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amounts of their time to defending increased use of CBA in setting environmental, health, and 
safety standards.44 
II.  Lochnerism 
Scholars traditionally associate Lochnerism with the creation of substantive due process 
doctrines that recognized economic rights not literally present in the Constitution.45   Viewed this 
way, the Lochner period involved subjective misreading of the Constitution.46  Viewed narrowly 
as only a mode of Constitutional interpretation Lochnerism has little to do with regulatory 
reform.  But neither the Supreme Court nor modern legal historians have viewed Lochnerism 
quite this narrowly.47  They have examined the attitudes, doctrines, and approaches that lay 
behind the Lochner-era Court’s decisions.  The treatment below does not attempt to settle the 
                                                 
 44 See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC POSNER, FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
(forthcoming 2006); Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment:  Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and 
Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977 (2004); Matthew D. Adler, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Static Efficiency, and the 
Goals of Environmental Law, 31 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 591 (2004); Sunstein, supra note 21; Hahn & Sunstein, 
supra note 25, at 1489 (proposing a new executive order to make CBA more influential); Robert H. Frank & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 324 (2001) (supporting CBA even 
while disapproving of a willingness-to-pay basis for estimating benefits); Matthew D. Adler, & Eric A. Posner, 
Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105 (2000) [hereinafter 
Adler & Posner, Distorted Preferences]; Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure:  A Welfarist Theory 
of Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241 (2000) [hereinafter, Adler & Posner, Welfarist Theory] (following up on 
the theory set out in the 1999 article); COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS:  LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric Posner eds. 2000); Adler & Posner, supra note 25 (providing a 
philosophical rationale for CBA); Matthew D. Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1371 (1998) (addressing arguments that the inability to compare unlike things makes CBA impossible or 
iuappropriate); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995); 
SUnstein, supra note 41, at 462 (arguing for CBA).  Cf. Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Time:  A Comment on 
Judge William’s Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis,  53 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 271 (2001) [hereinafter, Adler, Judge 
Williams] (characterizing Adler’s’ support for CBA as more tentative than that of Judge Williams).  See also 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 26 (addressing an issue related to CBA); Matthew D. Adler, Against Individual Risk:  A 
Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121 (2005) (same).  
 45  Cf. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 3 (1993) (claiming that legal scholars 
generally embrace this view). 
 46 See Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B. U. L. REV. 859, 860-61 (2005) (explaining 
how Lochner came to be a symbol of inappropriate judicial activism).  
 47 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT:  LAW AND 
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937 3-4 (1998) (describing the ideology dominating legal thought between 1886 and 
1937 as a “classical outlook” addressing important jurisprudential questions); GILLMAN, supra note 45, at 10 
(arguing that the Lochner period featured an effort to distinguish valid economic legislation from “invalid `class’ 
legislation”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995) (Souter J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Lochner-
era Court used “notions of liberty and property characteristic of laissez-faire economics” as “fulcrums of judicial 
review”). 
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debate about how to properly interpret Lochnerism.  But it does try to flesh out some of the 
Lochnerism concepts relevant to contemporary regulatory reform.        
A.  Ideology  
Justice Holmes famously chastised the Court for reading its own value choices into the 
Constitution in his dissent in Lochner v. New York,48 in which the Court struck down a statute 
limiting bakers’ working hours  as an unconstitutional interference with liberty of contract 
violative of due process.49  Holmes protested that the “Constitution does not enact Mr. Herbert 
Spencer’s social statistics,”50 a reference to nineteenth century economic theory that still enjoyed 
a following at the time.  He accused the Court of basing its decision “upon an economic theory 
which a large part of the country does not entertain,” presumably that of laissez-faire.51  While 
laissez-faire did not command universal support at the time, it enjoyed significant support among 
many well educated lawyers and businessmen.52   
Lochnerian ideology did not invariably lead to anti-government results.  While the 
Lochner-era Court struck down many statues for reasons that appear wholly indefensible to most 
contemporary observers, it upheld the overwhelming majority of statutes it reviewed.53  Indeed, 
just a few years before the Lochner Court had invalidated limits on bakers’ hours, the Court had 
                                                 
 48  198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 49  Id. at 52-53, 56-57 (majority opinion).  
 50 Id. at 75.  
 51 Id.  
 52 ID. at 82.  
 53 See Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 821,  830-32 
(2005) (reviewing the success rate of governments defending both federal and state statutes from constitutional 
attack); Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power-The United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 
667, 695 (1913) (finding that the Court frequently upheld state action in both the due process and commerce clause 
context); Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 294-
295 (1913) (finding that the Court invalidated only 37 statutes in making 560 decisions under the Fourteenth 
Amendment between 1887 and 1911).  
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upheld similar limitations on the miners’ hours in Holden v. Hardy.54  Laissez-faire ideology 
strongly influenced the Court, but it did not invariably dictate anti-government results.55   
B.  Natural Law Origins 
While contemporary laissez-faire ideology helps explain the Court’s rulings, the Court 
did not see itself as ideological.  Rather, it saw itself as a neutral actor advancing legal ideals 
with neutral origins outside of the judges’ personal preferences.56   
Some accounts of Lochnerism associate it with legal historicism, the idea that principles 
not expressly found in the Constitution, such as liberty of contract, merit judicial protection as 
objective natural law principles embedded in our legal tradition.57  The Lochner Court declared 
that “[t]he general right to make a contract . . . is part of the liberty interest protected by the 14th 
Amendment.”58  Because a maximum hours law prohibited the employer and employee from 
contracting for more work hours than the statute permitted, it interfered with liberty of contract.59  
The Court, drawing on common law tradition, viewed the ability to enter into contracts as an 
aspect of the liberty to freely pursue a livelihood, which it considered part of the pursuit of 
happiness, a right with which men are, in the Declaration’s of Independence’s words, “endowed 
                                                 
 54 169 U.S. 366 (1897).   
 55 See WIECEK, supra note 47, at 7 (claiming that the Court was ideological, but not consistently so).  
 56 See ID. at  5 (linking Lochnerism’s use of abstraction with neutrality purportedly preventing a 
judge’s personal sympathy from swaying him); Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 878 
(1987) (the due process clause commanded “neutrality” in the view of the Lochner-era Court).   
57  See, e.g., JAMES HACKNEY, UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE 33 (2006) (forthcoming) (describing 
Lochner as “the most infamous application of the natural law worldview”); Note, Meet Me at the (West Coast) 
Hotel:  The Lochner Era and the Demise of Roe v. Wade, 90 MINN. L. REV. 500, 509-510 (2005) (the Adkins Court 
rests its holding “on a particular philosophical anthropology of the human person and that theory’s consonant 
natural rights”) (emphasis added); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism Revised: Lochner and the Origins 
of Fundamental Rights, 92 Geo. L. J. 1, 35-39 (2003). 
 58   See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
 59 Id. at 52.  
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by their Creator.”60  Thus, it viewed liberty of contract as having natural law origins, which it 
identified with the common law.61 
C.  Skepticism Toward Non-Neutral Legislation    
In spite of the natural, indeed divine, origins of liberty of contract, the Lochner-era Court 
did not view that liberty as an absolute right.  It recognized that the state may “prevent the 
individual from making certain kinds of contracts,” provided that the state acted within the scope 
of its “legitimate . . . police power."62  Since the Court generally found that the police power 
embraced all “reasonable” regulation, judicial assessment of regulation’s reasonableness 
determined the scope of legitimate police power legislation.63  The Court’s attitudes toward 
legislation, then, often proved dispositive of Lochner-era cases.64   
The Lochner-era Court viewed government regulation with some skepticism.  Because 
modern regulatory reform proponents echo Lochner-era attitudes toward regulation, an 
examination of the nature of the Court’s approach to legislation will prove worthwhile.   
                                                 
 60 See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897) (linking liberty of contract to the “pursuit 
of happiness” right mentioned in the Declaration of Independence through the right to pursue a livelihood); 
Butchers’ Union Slaughterhouse & Livestock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughterhouse 
Co., 111 U.S. 746, 761-62 (1884) (Bradley J. concurring) (linking the right to pursue a livelihood to the Declaration 
of Independence’s inalienable rights clause and to British common law traditions opposing monopolies). 
 61 Jeffrey M. Shaman, On the 100th Anniversary of Lochner v. New York, 72 TENN. L. REV. 455, 489 
(2005) (arguing that the Lochner Court  employed “common law categories and presumptions” to “deif[y]” markets 
as a “natural state of affairs”); Laurence Tribe, Clarence Thomas and “Natural Law,” N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991, at 
A15 (stating that the Lochner Court relied upon natural law); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515 1965) 
(Black J. dissenting) (claiming that Lochner embodies a “natural law due process philosophy”).  See Francis J. 
Mootz, Law in Flux, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 11 YALE J. L. & HUMAN., 311, 334-335 (1999) (pointing out that 
Aquinas treated natural as coming from God); Philip Sofer, Some Natural Confusions about Natural Law, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 2393, 2405, 2397 (1991-1992) (pointing out that some natural law theories suggest that “God’s will can . . . 
be the source of moral truth); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness:  The 
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. IN L. & SOC. 5 (1980) (describing Lochner as a 
synthesis of a “positivist science of law, natural rights constitutionalism, and Classical Economics”). 
 62 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
 63 See OWEN M. FISS, 7 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES:  TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE 1888-1910, 161-63 (1993) (Justice Peckham’s 
Lochner opinion sought to preserve limits on the police power).  
 64 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at  75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Lochner majority’s 
decision hinged upon the majority’s “convictions or prejudices.”). 
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 1.  Class Legislation   
Even before the Lochner period, the Supreme Court distinguished between “general 
legislation,” which it usually upheld, and “class” or “special” legislation.65  This ideal of neutral 
legislation may have performed the useful function of discouraging special interest legislation in 
a society where wealth and power were not highly concentrated.66  But by the time of the 
Lochner period the idea that the Constitution frowned upon class legislation was widely seen as 
counterproductive, because it sometimes prevented legislatures from addressing great disparities 
of power and wealth that had arisen with the growth of modern corporations.67   
Professor Gillman has argued that the Lochner-era Court implicitly used this idea that 
“class legislation” lacked constitutional legitimacy to strike down regulatory legislation.68  The 
sense that one-sided legislation lacked legitimacy also animated decisions interpreting the anti-
trust laws as authorizing the use of injunctions as a weapon against organized labor.69  While 
                                                 
 65 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Texas, 139 U.S. 137 U.S. 692, 697-98 (1891) (unanimous opinion) (laws 
operating “on all alike” secure due process but “special, partial, and arbitrary” legislation offend due process); Dent 
v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 111, 124 (1889) (unanimous opinion) (“legislation” is not open to substantive due 
process challenge if it is “general in its operation.”).  
 66  See generally  Sunstein, supra note 56, at 878-79 (equating the Lochner-era requirement of a 
public purpose for legislation with hostility to “special-interest legislation.”)  
 67  See J. M. Balkin, Ideology and Counter-Ideology from Lochner to Garcia, 54 UMKC L. REV. 175, 
176 n. 7 (1985-86) (pointing out that “the Court’s exaltation of liberty of contract concealed the economic coercion” 
that free contracts may produce when parties have unequal bargaining power.) 
68  GILLMAN, supra note 45.  See also  FISS, supra note 63, at 160-61 (1993) (explaining that the 
Lochner Court did not regard alteration of the “distribution of power or wealth” as a legitimate end of legislation); 
Balkin, supra note 67, at 182-83 (arguing that the Lochner-era Court considered redistributive law suspect).  Cf. 
Bernstein, supra note 57, at 12 (accusing Gillman of “greatly” exaggerating the role of class legislation concerns in 
Lochner-era jurisprudence); Michael J. Phillips, The Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 
453, 497 (1998) (admitting that Gillman’s class legislation thesis “has some plausibility” but expressing some 
doubts about it).  
 69  See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 471 (1920) (construing section of 
law limiting labor injunctions narrowly as class legislation); Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-Cities Cent. Trades Council, 
257 U.S. 184, 202, 205 (1921) (picketers coercively interfere with a property right).   See also Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 
U.S. 161 (1908); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).  Cf. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 9, 16-18 (1895) 
(anti-trust laws do not regulate sugar monopoly).  See generally GILLMAN, supra note 45, at 1-2 (identifying 
Lochnerism with the “use of the injunction against” labor); FISS,  supra note 63, at  3-5 (explaining that labor 
injunctions helped make the Court’s performance an issue in several Presidential elections and led to passage of 
remedial legislation); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, 98-127 
(1991) (discussing the impact of the labor injunction upon the labor movement).   
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Congress intended anti-trust statutes to limit businesses’ power,70 the background constitutional 
principle that law should be general, and hence neutral, led the Court to use the anti-trust law as a 
justification for enjoining labor actions71.  Thus, the Lochner-era Court’s rulings suggest 
suspicion of the idea that Congress might legitimately choose non-neutral policies to address 
imbalances in a society where everybody is not on an equal footing.  And this hostility toward 
legislative value choices influenced not just the Court’s substantive due process decisions, but 
contemporaneous statutory interpretation as well. 
This neutrality ideal, however, went beyond the formal doctrinal distinction between 
class and general legislation.  That doctrinal distinction offered but one manifestation of a more 
general view that law should be neutral, in the sense of not favoring one group over another.72  
This view melded with a belief in the neutrality of common law and natural law.73  So, for 
example, the Court favored liberty of contract in part because it perceived freedom from state 
imposed regulation superseding potential contractual agreements as affecting both parties to 
contracts equally.74  
This belief in neutrality manifested itself in a failure to believe that law properly tipped 
the scales in favor of one class or the other.  In Lochner, for example, Justice Harlan’s dissent 
recognized that the legislature viewed the ten hour work week as protecting bakers from being 
                                                 
 70  See Duplex Printing, 254 U.S. at 468 n. 1 (setting out statutory language that appears to prohibit 
anti-labor injunctions, even though the statute clearly authorizes injunctions against business combinations in 
restraint of trade).  
 71  See id. at 471 (construing section that prohibits injunctions in employment disputes narrowly, 
because it creates a “special privilege” for a “particular class.”).    
 72 See Cushman, supra note 11, at 886-88 (describing how contemporary scholars and case law 
suggest that an ideal of neutrality and equal treatment animated interpretation of the 14th Amendment); Note, supra, 
note 57, at 511 (discussing a “principle of neutrality” governing judicial intervention in police power regulation).   
 73 See Charles W. McCurdy, The Roots of Liberty of Contract Reconsidered:  Major Premises in the 
Law of Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y 20, 20-21 (stating that the Court identified 
objectivity with common law doctrine).   
 74 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52-53 (portraying the limitation of bakers’ working hours as interfering 
with both the employee’s and the employer’s liberty to contract freely).  
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forced to work longer hours.75  The majority, however, refused to credit the idea that employers 
might enjoy stronger bargaining power than workers, treating the statute limiting baker’s hours 
as perversely limiting the baker’s ability to voluntarily contract for long hours in order to provide 
for his family.76  Thus, the ideal of neutral law led to an assumption that laws designed to favor 
one class over another would fail to achieve their objectives of bettering the favored class’ lot.77 
 2.  Formalism and Neutral Categories 
In keeping with an ideal of law as a value-free objective enterprise, the Court used formal 
neutral distinctions as a general method for decision-making, employing the sort of mechanical 
formalism that the legal realists decried.78  For example, the Court distinguished activities that 
directly affected commerce, which Congress could regulate, from activities that indirectly 
affected Commerce, which Congress could not regulate.79  Lochner itself illustrates this use of 
neutral abstract distinctions.  The Court that struck down New York’s limitations on bakers’ 
                                                 
 75 See id. at 69 (arguing that the statute reflected a belief that employees were “compelled to . . . 
submit” to overly long hours). 
 76 The statute at issue prohibited employers from requiring workers to labor for more than 10 hours 
in a day.  Id. at 45 n. †.  Justice Peckham begins his opinion for the majority by denying that the statute prohibits 
coercion.  Id. at 52.  He argues that the statute prohibits nothing more than a voluntary contract.  Id.  He portrays the 
statute not as protecting the employee from being forced to labor long hours to avoid being fired, but from 
interfering with an employee’s voluntary decision to work longer hours to earn more money.  Id. at 52-53.  Later 
Justice Peckham writes that the statute “might seriously cripple the ability of the laborer to support himself and his 
family.”  Id. at 59.  
 77 Cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1936) (recognizing that workers often do 
not have sufficient bargaining power to obtain a living wage).  
 78 See Note, supra, note 57, at 510 (pointing out that the Court prior to the Nebbia case employed 
“formal  categories to distinguish . . . types of economic activity”); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW:  
HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THEORY, 77-79 (2004) (discussing legal realist critiques of “conceptual” and “rule” 
formalism); WIECEK, supra note 47, at 4-5 (describing “legal classicism” as “abstract, formal, conceptualist, 
categorical, and (sometimes) deductive” and noting that this “abstraction promoted neutrality”); Roscoe Pound, 
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908) (presenting a legal realist critique of formalism).  Cf. 
Balkin, supra note 67, at 180-82 (discussing a similar notion of conceptualism as typifying Lochner-era 
jurisprudence).    
 79 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307-09 (1936) (striking down minimum wage and 
labor regulations benefiting coal miners because such regulation only has an “indirect” effect on interstate 
commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 605-607 (1995) (Souter J., dissenting) (suggesting that the 
Lochner-era Court used the direct/indirect distinction to subject economic regulation to judicial policy judgments). 
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hours in Lochner had upheld similar legislation limiting miners’ hours.80  The Court justified this 
discrepancy in terms of an abstract categorical distinction between “arbitrary” regulation, which 
the due process clause prohibited, and “reasonable” regulation, which the due process clause 
allowed.81  It found regulation of bakers’ hours arbitrary, but similar restrictions on the miners’ 
hours reasonable.82   
Justice Holmes’ Lochner dissent famously expressed skepticism about neutral 
distinctions’ capacity to lead to neutral, or even defensible, decisions.  He wrote, “General 
propositions do not decide concrete cases.”83  And Holmes wrote that “Every opinion tends to 
become law,”84 thereby suggesting that the Justices personal opinions, not the formal legal 
categories employed, controlled the cases.  Indeed, the Lochner majority opined that long 
working hours for bakers posed no health hazard justifying regulation,85 whilst Justice Harlan’s 
dissent expressed a willingness to credit the legislative judgment that too much baking damages 
a baker’s health86.  The Lochner-era Court sometimes used abstract categories to mask decisions 
based on the decision-makers’ personal opinions, as both Holmes and many modern Supreme 
Court Justices have pointed out.87   
                                                 
 80 See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 380, 398 (1897). 
81 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (framing the constitutional question economic 
legislation raised as whether the legislation was “an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary” interference with 
personal liberty or a “reasonable exercise of the police power.”)  See generally Robert P. Reeder, Is Unreasonable 
Legislation Unconstitutional, 62 U. PA. L. REV. 191, 191 (1914) (explaining that substantive due process cases 
declare that the Court may strike down legislation it finds “unreasonable or arbitrary.”) 
82 See Holden, 169 U.S. 366 (upholding a law limiting the work day of underground miners). 
 83 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  See also id. at 59 (expressing view that 
baking for long hours creates no health hazard justifying regulation) (majority opinion).  
 84 Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 85 See id. at 59 (“We think that there can be no fair doubt that the trade of a baker . . . is not an 
unhealthy one . . .”).  
 86 See id. at 69-71 (expressing a willingness to defer to legislative judgment in light of expert support 
for the proposition that baking can be hazardous).  
 87 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (characterizing Lochner as 
imposing a “particular economic ideology on the Constitution.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995) 
(Souter J. dissenting) (characterizing Lochnerism as involving “exacting scrutiny” of legislative means and ends); 
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 3.  Hyper-Rationalism 
This skepticism toward legislation also manifested itself in a demanding approach to the 
rationales offered for government regulation.88  The Court often expected not just a plausible 
justification for a regulation, but a rather compelling case, which might be very difficult to make 
for any regulation involving precise line drawing.89  For example, the Lochner Court found the 
argument that “ten hours” of work is healthful, but ten and a half hours is not “unreasonable and 
entirely arbitrary.”90  Part three presents more examples of this hyper-rationalism in explaining 
how closely it resembles modern regulatory reformers’ approach.  Importantly, the Court’s 
rationality concept involved a strong tendency to view “class legislation” as arbitrary.91  Hence, 
hyper-rationalism derived much of its content from an ideal of value-free general legislation. 
D.  The Gilded Age’s Cost-Benefit State 
The Court frequently employed a rough cost-benefit test to distinguish arbitrary from 
reasonable government regulation.92  Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,93 the second most famous 
                                                                                                                                                             
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 491-92 (1993) (O’Connor,  J. dissenting) (describing 
Lochner as a decision constitutionalizing economic ideology).  Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833,  861-62  (1992) (describing Lochner as premised false factual assumptions about the capacity of unregulated 
markets to provide for minimal welfare); TXO, 509 U.S. at 470-71 (Scalia, J., concurring) (identifying Lochner with 
the creation of unenumerated rights under the 14th Amendment).    
 88 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 606 (Souter, J., dissenting) (identifying Lochnerism with “exacting judicial 
scrutiny of legislative choices”); TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1346 (characterizing Lochner as exemplifying “strict and 
skeptical means-ends analysis.”).   
 89 See TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1346-47 (noting that the Lochner Court found that long hours did harm 
a baker’s health, in spite of “considerable evidence” that it did).  
 90 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62.  The Lochner Court framed this contention in terms of whether the 
bread, not the baker, becomes unhealthy when the baker works more than ten hours.  See id.  This framing came 
from the idea that protecting the baker’s health is an illegitimate private end.  See id. at 59-61 (finding that a baker’s 
employment is not so unhealthy as to justifying upholding the law as a health law).   
 91 See Cushman, supra note  11, at 886-88 (explaining how contemporary Lochner-era scholars 
equated “arbitrary” legislation with legislation favoring one group over another or redistributing resources).  
 92 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. 
L. REV. 379, 393 (1988) (arguing that the Lochner period judges “wrote into the Constitution a unique American 
perspective on classical economics”).  The Court did, however, prohibit price regulation in industries not affected 
with some substantial public interest.  See Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 
535 (1923); Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1927); Hamilton, 
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exemplar of Lochnerism, illustrates the Court’s embrace of CBA.  The Adkins Court struck down 
a statute authorizing an administrative agency to establish a minimum wage for women.94  In 
explaining why the legislation was so unreasonable as to offend due process, Justice Sutherland, 
writing for the Adkins majority, explained that the law requires the employer to pay the 
administratively established wage “because the employee needs it, but requires no service of 
equivalent value from the employee.”95  This suggests a familiar economic model.   A wage 
payment, like any other payment for a good or service, should secure benefits to the payer at 
least equal to the cost.  If the employer must pay more than the services are worth to the 
employer, the costs (the wage payments) exceed the benefits (services rendered), for, as the 
Court explains, the premium that the minimum wage law extracts does not generate any 
corresponding extra benefit.96  Accordingly, the Adkins Court, in explaining why it found the law 
arbitrary, complained that “efficiency . . . forms no part of the policy of the legislation.”97  This 
case is one of numerous cases in which a cost-benefit model informed the Court’s effort to 
distinguish arbitrary class legislation from reasonable permissible regulation.98 
                                                                                                                                                             
Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L. J. 1089 (1930); McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a 
Public Interest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930).  
 93 261 U.S. 525 (1923).  
 94 Id. at 539, 562.  
 95 Id. at 557. 
 96 See id. at 558 (complaining that the “moral requirement implicit in every contract . . . that the 
amount to be paid and the service to be rendered shall bear to each other some relation of just equivalence is 
completely ignored.”).  While the Court employed a cost- benefit model, it probably did not have a neoclassical 
economic conception of marginal cost theory in mind.  As Professor Hovenkamp has explained, Adkins reflects a 
contemporary economic theory rejected by the neoclassical economists, called the “wage-fund doctrine.”  See 
Hovenkamp, supra note 92, at 431-37.  Under this doctrine forced transfers between capitalists and labor would 
produce disasters for the laborer.  Id. at 433.  This idea found expression in the Adkins opinion.  See id. at 437 (citing 
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 557).  This discrepancy between neoclassical economics and the particulars of Lochnerism 
hardly harms the analogy between Lochnerism and regulatory reform, because the details of marginal cost theory 
have not figured prominently in regulatory reformers’ case for CBA.       
 97 Adkins, 261 U.S. at 557.  
 98 See Cushman, supra note 11, at 885-88, 896 (defining class legislation as that which arbitrarily 
transfers property “from A to B” and showing how Adkins’ CBA led to the conclusion that the minimum wage 
statute was class legislation in this sense). 
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Rough CBA also played a prominent role in the era’s cases addressing regulation of 
prices charged by public utilities, railroads, and similar entities.99  In Smyth v. Ames, a leading 
rate regulation case of the period, the Court held that states may not establish railroad rates 
below the level needed to justly compensate the railroad for providing service to the public.100  
Again, this reflects a cost-benefit model, suggesting that a carrier should receive payments 
roughly commensurate with the cost of providing its service.   While the Court failed to agree 
upon a precise methodology to calculate the required “just” rate of return on investment, this 
concept dominated subsequent rate-making cases.101  And this cost-benefit test led the Court to 
strike down rate regulations in some thirty-nine cases between 1897 and 1937.102   
A cost-benefit framework also played a role in decisions upholding rate regulations.  For 
example, in Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Co. v. United States, the Court upheld a statute 
confiscating “excess” profits from heavily traveled railroad lines to subsidize service on less 
traveled routes.103   Rents in excess of the benefits conferred conflict with economic models, 
which define efficiency in terms of arrangements equating benefits and costs.104  Even though 
the statute forced, in effect, a transfer payment “from A to B,” the Court unanimously upheld it, 
                                                 
 99 See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 92, at 440 (the Supreme Court of the Lochner period 
permitted “state intervention only where the classical economists . . . would have permitted it.”)   
 100 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898) (requiring states to establish rates that will “admit of 
the carrier earning such compensation as under all the circumstances is just to it and to the public.”).  See Cushman, 
supra note 11, at 909 (describing Smith v. Ames as the culmination of a line of rate making cases).  See also Reagan 
v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 410 (1894) (suggesting that just as equal protection of the laws forbids 
compelling “one class . . . to suffer loss that others may gain,” justice forbids “use for the public benefit at less than 
its market value”)      
 101 See, e.g., Miss. R.R. Comm’n v. Mobile & Ohio R.R., 244 U.S. 388, 391 (1917) (describing rates 
that prevent “a fair return upon the property invested” as “arbitrary” and therefore void as repugnant to due process).  
 102 Phillips, supra note 68, at 498.  
 103 263 U.S. 456, 476, 485 (1924) (showing that Congress provided for the distribution of excessive 
profits and upholding the law on that basis).  
 104 See I HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS:  ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND 
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES, at 253-54 (2003) (defining the “social optimum” regulation or tax as one that equates 
marginal abatement cost to marginal damage); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability 
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 715, 725 (1996) (assuming that a rule where costs equals benefits 
is ideal); JOHN GOWDY & SABINE O'HARA, ECONOMIC THEORY FOR ENVIRONMENTALISTS 16 (1995). 
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because it did not impose costs exceeding benefits.  As Justice Taft explained, the Constitution 
does not guarantee “more than a fair net operating income,” so the owner “can not expect . . . 
high . . . returns.”105   
In many cases outside the rate-making context as well, a CBA-like model proved 
influential.106  Hence, a CBA-like model played a leading role in a significant portion of the 
Court’s economic due process cases.    
 E.  Repudiation of Lochnerism 
 The Supreme Court eventually rejected searching judicial review of economic 
legislation’s reasonableness.107  In doing so, it expressly recognized the necessity and legitimacy  
of legislative value choice.108 
 The acceptance of legislative value choices led not only to the abandonment of 
substantive due process review of economic regulation, but also to the practice of generally 
                                                 
 105 Id. at 481.  
 106 See, e.g., R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 349 (1935) (invalidating requirement that 
railroad reemploying a worker who left a railroad’s service before the statute’s enactment to include that service in 
pension calculations, because that premium pays “for services fully compensated” under the previous contract for 
service); Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 97, 100 (1931) (invaliding exemption of “short line” railroads 
from obligation to pay fees for use of other lines’ cars, because mandating free use of property is “arbitrary and 
unreasonable.”); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of La., 251 U.S. 396, 399 (1920) (invalidating an order 
requiring owner of a narrow gauge railroad to operate at a loss); Myles Salt Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 239 U.S. 478, 
485 (1916) (prohibiting a drainage district from taxing a property that would receive no benefits corresponding to 
the tax); Chicago, Rock Island, & Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491, 499 (1915) 
(invalidating a statute prohibiting lowering of an unoccupied upper berth  in a sleeping car where a passenger has 
occupied a lower berth because this prohibition takes “salable space without pay.”); St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & S. 
R.R. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354, 358-59 (1912) (invalidating requirement that railroad pay claims for injured 
livestock within thirty days of demand to avoid double damages and a fee award when it creates “extraordinary 
liability” for “refusing to pay” an “excessive demand,”  i.e. one exceeding the value of the livestock) [emphasis 
added]. 
107 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 
(1963) (repudiating unreasonableness test for substantive due process, because it leads judges to “strike down laws” 
thought “unwise  or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy.”).  Cf. New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis J. dissenting) (warning of the danger of enacting judicial “prejudices 
into legal principles” through review of social and economic legislation under the “arbitrary” and “capricious” 
standard of substantive due process).     
 108 Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 726 (“legislatures . . must decide upon the wisdom and utility of 
legislation”). 
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accepting legislative line drawing under the equal protection clause (at least where no suspect 
classification is involved).109 The modern Court’s substantive due process and equal protection 
cases specifically repudiate the tradition of viewing “class” legislation as suspect.110  The modern 
doctrine requires the Court to uphold any legislative distinctions (between classes or otherwise) 
unless the distinctions drawn wholly lack a “rational basis”.111  The Court’s decisions recognize 
that its prior approach to judicial review had led to the creation of legal principles based on 
judges’ economic and social views, in spite of (or perhaps because of) the use of neutral 
categories.112  The Court also recognized, at about the same time that it repudiated its Lochner-
era constitutional jurisprudence, that Congress considered the Court’s neutralist anti-trust 
jurisprudence a similar abuse of power and abandoned the use of the labor injunction under anti-
trust statutes.113  Finally, in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,114 the Court repudiated the 
natural law tradition that partially underlay legal historicism.115 
III.  Parallels with Regulatory Reform   
                                                 
 109  See, e.g., Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 732 (stating that the Equal Protection Clause only prevents 
invidious discrimination); Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489 (same).  See generally Cushman, supra note 11, at 888-95 
(explaining that during the Lochner period the Court often did not sharply distinguish Due Process from Equal 
Protection).     
 110 See West Coast Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 397 (1937) (approving of the Adkins dissent’s view 
that the legislature may properly sustain a minimum wage because it benefits “employees” as a class).  The Parish 
Court also recognized the inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees.  Id. at 393-94, 398-99.  
It accordingly overruled a leading Lochner-era case, Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, in Parish. Id. at 400.    
 111 See United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (legislation will be upheld unless it 
precludes the “assumption that it rests upon a rational basis”); Williamson, 348 U.S. at 491 (upholding regulation 
because the regulation has a rational relation to an objective); Adler, supra note 12, at 118-119 (both the equal 
protection clause and the due process clause require a minimal rational relationship between a law and a legitimate 
government purpose). 
112 See Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 729-30; Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488 (stating that “the day is gone 
when this Court uses the Due Process Clause to strike down state laws . . . because they may be unwise, 
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”) 
 113 See Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prod., 311 U.S. 91, 102-03 
(1940) (discussing Congressional findings of “abuses of judicial power” and misinterpretation of anti-trust law)  
 114 304 U.S. 64 (1938)  
 115 See id. at 79 (rejecting the existence of a “transcendental body of law”).  
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 As suggested previously, contemporary regulatory reformers’ attitudes toward legislation 
resemble those of the Lochner Court.   Before developing this parallel, it will prove helpful to 
review the role of economic ideology and judicial activism in regulatory reform.116  While in this 
realm contemporary regulatory reform does not perfectly resemble Lochnerism, judicial activism 
and economic ideology have played important roles in regulatory reform, just as they did in 
advancing laissez-faire capitalism in the Lochner period. 
 A.  Judicial Activism 
The modern Court’s rejection of substantive due process review of economic regulation 
has made that weapon off limits to regulatory reformers challenging regulatory statutes.  We 
have already seen that the Court rejected an effort to revive the nondelegation doctrine as a check 
on regulatory legislation in American Trucking.  Indeed, Constitutional law generally plays a 
much lesser role in contemporary regulatory reform than it did in the Lochnerian attack on 
regulation.  The executive orders requiring CBA have certainly been more important to 
regulatory reform than constitutional law. 
Yet, the Court has employed substantive due process to carry out tort reform, which 
conservative think tanks and business groups, the leading drivers of regulatory reform, support 
along with CBA.117  The Court has prohibited “grossly excessive” punitive damage awards as a 
matter of substantive due process.118  The Court employs a rough cost-benefit test, an evaluation 
of the ratio of the punitive damages to the actual harm inflicted upon the plaintiff, as a significant 
                                                 
 116 See generally Shaman, supra note 61, at 490 (noting that some insist that the main problem with 
the Lochner Court was excessive activism).  
 117 See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 561 n. * (1996) (listing business groups and 
Washington Legal Foundation, a conservative think tank, as supporting constitutional limits on punitive damage 
awards); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 445 n. * (1993) (same); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 8 n.  4 (1990) (listing business groups appearing as amici seeking substantive due process limits 
on punitive damage awards).   See generally, Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1093 (2005). 
 118 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.   
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element of its approach to determining excessiveness.119  In developing this test for judicial tort 
reform the Court relied upon several Lochner-era precedents.120  In the debate about what test to 
apply to damage awards, Justice O’Connor noted the relationship between regulatory reform and 
Lochnerism.  She opined that “[J]ust as the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Statistics, it does not require us to adopt the views of the Law and Economics 
school either.”121  Yet, when the Court for the first time in its history actually struck down a 
damages award under the Lochner-era substantive due process excessiveness test, Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence faulted the Alabama Supreme Court for failing to apply “any economic 
theory” to support its punitive damages award.122  Justice O’Connor signed on to the Breyer 
concurrence, apparently because it distinguishes judicial insistence that the Constitution 
embodies “some economic theory” from judicial insistence that the Constitution embodies a 
particular economic theory.123  This concurring view would, in essence, constitutionalize a 
central tenant of the regulatory reform movement, which generally employs an approach to 
regulation predicated upon economic concepts without any evident agreement about details.124  
Justices Scalia and Thomas have rejected the excessiveness inquiry precisely because it reflects 
                                                 
 119 BMW, 517 U.S. at 580 (citing this factor as “perhaps the most commonly cited indicium (sic) of . . 
. excessive punitive damages”)  
 120 See TXO, 509 U.S. at 453-54 (plurality opinion) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes 
substantive limit upon penalties) (citing Seaboard Air Lines R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907); St. Louis, 
I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 224 U.S. 270, 286 (1919); and Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286 
(1912)); Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (citing TXO to support the notion of substantive due process imposing a limit on 
punitive damage awards).  See also BMW, 517 U.S. at 600-01 (discussing the Court’s reliance on Lochner-era 
precedents).  A majority in TXO defended reliance on these Lochner-era precedents on the grounds that the Lochner 
dissenters joined the opinions relied upon.  TXO, 509 U.S. at 455 (plurality opinion for three Justices), 479-80 
(dissenting opinion for three Justices) (agreeing with the plurality’s adherence to these precedents).     
 121 TXO, 509 U.S. at 491 (Justice O’Connor, dissenting) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)),  
 122 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 593 (Breyer, J., concurring).    
 123 See id. (drawing this distinction).    
 124 See generally, Sen, supra note 22, at 932-33 (noting that proponents of CBA do not agree about 
what precisely it means).  
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the Lochnerian error of finding unenumerated substantive rights in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.125   
 These cases do not reflect Lochnerian attitudes toward legislation, for they are not 
directed toward legislation.  Rather, they reflect skepticism toward juries.126  Furthermore, this 
use of Lochnerism in the service of tort reform has proven somewhat limited so far.  The Court 
has only issued two opinions invalidating punitive damages awards to date, but it has also 
vacated several other jury awards in light of these decisions.127         
Judicially created doctrines of standing and broad sovereign immunity sometimes impede 
environmental laws’ enforcement.128  These doctrines reflect the Court’s continuing tendency to 
treat common law baselines as somehow natural and to read them into the Constitution.129 Thus, 
                                                 
 125 TXO, 509 U.S. at 470-71 (Scalia, J. concurring) (declining to find a “secret repository of . . . 
unenumerated substantive rights” in the Due Process Clause and finding it “particularly difficult to imagine” that the 
Clause authorizes judicial limits on punitive damages).   See also BMW, 517 U.S. at 599-602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(claiming that the Lochner-era cases upon which the Court relies “simply fabricated the due process right at issue” 
in dicta). 
 126 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417-18 (2003) (expressing 
concerns about jury verdicts reflecting prejudice, bias or whims); TXO, 509 U.S. at 464 (plurality opinion) (juries 
hearing about the wealth of a wrongdoer may act based on “prejudice against large corporations”); 467 (Kennedy J. 
concurring) (suggesting that substantive due process review of jury verdicts should guard against punitive damage 
awards reflecting jury “bias, passion, or prejudice”); 474 (O’Connor, J. dissenting) (claiming that “arbitrariness, 
caprice, passion, bias, and even malice” infects jurors more often than judges); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 
U.S. 1, 43 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (juries inflict “multimillion dollar losses” upon defendants “on a 
whim”). 
 127 See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (finding punitive damages award unreasonable); BMW, 517 U.S. at 
585-86 (finding a punitive damage award “grossly excessive”); Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive 
Damages Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1365 (2005) (stating that the Court vacated damage awards against 
five defendants after Campbell).  
 128 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563-64, 579 (1992) (plurality and 
concurring opinions) (requiring plaintiffs to purchase tickets to visit places whence an endangered species might 
vanish to establish standing to challenge failure of government to apply the Endangered Species Act to federally 
funded projects overseas); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,  734-41 (1972) (requiring the Sierra Club to obtain 
an affidavit from one of its members who uses the Mineral King Valley before permitting suit aimed at blocking a 
ski resort there); Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 57 (2nd Cir. 1999) (dismissing, on sovereign immunity grounds, 
a citizen suit against a state under several environmental statutes).   
 129 See Sunstein, supra note 56, at 878-79 (explaining that the Court tended to view departures from 
common law baselines defining neutrality as class legislation serving special interests).  See also Albert C. Lin, 
Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the Supreme Court’s 2003-2004 Term, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 565, 605-
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for example, while Article III’s literal language authorizing adjudication of not only cases, but 
also “controversies” seems to allow anybody who disagrees with an administrative decision to 
challenge it,130 the Court has required a showing of injury that reflects a common law model of a 
lawsuit.131  Similarly, the Court has stretched sovereign immunity’s scope far beyond what the  
11th Amendment’s text authorizes, relying on the proposition that the framers intended to 
preserve common law sovereign immunity.132  But still, these doctrines have not materially 
advanced regulatory reform; they have merely complicated enforcement of some law at times.133 
                                                                                                                                                             
619 (2005) (explaining how the Court has used common law causation concepts to narrow the scope of 
environmental statutes). 
 130  See David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing:  The Paradox of Demanding a Concrete Context for 
Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 877 (2004) (claiming that standing has no textual basis in Article 
III); Robert J. Pushaw, Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Function of Federal Courts, 69 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 480-82, 526-27 (1994) (arguing that cases do not necessarily involve controversies 
between adverse parties); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (suggesting that the literal 
language of Article III cannot justify standing doctrine by pointing out that an “executive inquiry” can be called a 
“case” and that a “legislative dispute” can be called a “controversy”).  See also Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in 
Public Actions:  Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L. J. 816, 840 (1969) (calling the idea that the 
Constitution requires injury “historically unfounded”). 
 131 See Driesen, supra note 130, at 835-36 (describing a private law model that undergirds the Court’s 
standing jurisprudence); Sunstein, supra note 56, at 893-94 (explaining how modern standing doctrine incorporates 
common law understandings).  See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term Foreword:  The Forms 
of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (describing a private law model of adjudication as dispute resolution).  
 132 See Driesen, supra note 130, at 832 (describing the difference between the Court’s version of 
sovereign immunity and the immunity explicitly set out in the 11th Amendment); Bd. Of Trs. Of the Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (acknowledging that the Court has extended state immunity to suits from their 
own citizens even though “by its terms” the 11th Amendment only applies to suits by citizens from another State); 
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000) (affirming that the Eleventh Amendment “stands not so 
much for what it says, but for the presupposition which it confirms”) (citation omitted); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 715-16 (1999) (invoking common law sovereign immunity to justify prohibiting Maine governmental 
employees from suing their state government for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 700 (1999) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (noting that sovereign 
immunity is a common law doctrine); Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 102-03 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(discussing sovereign immunity’s common law origins).  Cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) 
(holding that Congress had constitutionally abrogated sovereign immunity under the 14th Amendment in Title II of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act); Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724-25 (2003) (upholding 
a waiver of sovereign immunity to allow for private enforcement of The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993); 
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69 (majority opinion) (suggesting that sovereign immunity was not only a product of 
English common law, but part of the “fundamental jurisprudence in all civilized nations”) [citation and internal 
quotation omitted].  See generally Symposium:  State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE  DAME L. REV. 817 (2000); 
Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L. J. 1, 9-
13 (1988) (exploring the 11th Amendment and its interpretation prior to the recent change in jurisprudence). 
 133  See generally, Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 701-704 (charging that sovereign immunity, like 
Lochner, threatens to “deprive Congress of necessary legislative flexibility,” in part by limiting its ability to rely on 
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Increased judicial willingness to limit Congressional power over Commerce could 
threaten environmental law.134  Judicial limits on federal regulatory power can aid the agenda of 
some regulatory reformers who seek to transfer power over environmental matters from the 
federal government to the states.135  The dissenters in United States v. Lopez136 and United States 
v. Morrison137 complained that the Court has embraced a formalist distinction, between 
commercial and non-commercial activities, reminiscent of the Lochner-era’s mechanical 
jurisprudence, and as incapable of producing principled results as the old direct/indirect affects 
distinction.138  But these decisions are not divorced from Constitutional text as the old 
substantive due process jurisprudence was.139  The Constitution clearly does contemplate a 
                                                                                                                                                             
“a decentralized system of individual private remedies”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. 
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 655-660 (1999) (explaining why immunizing states from private suits for patent 
infringement may leave patent holders with inadequate remedies).. 
 134 See generally Branford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species:  Does the Endangered 
Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. 
L. REV. 723, 723-24 (2002) (“a broad reading of Lopez and Morrison might call into question . . . some 
environmental statutes or regulations”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress 
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting a prohibition on gun possession in school zones).  
 135 See William F. Pedersen, Contracting with the Regulated for Better Reglation, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1067,  1074 (2001) (identifying “a regulatory reform contract approach” with “devolution” of responsibility to the 
states and to regulated entities);  Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
1495, 1496 (1999) (explaining that much of the regulatory reform debate focuses on the question of what level of 
government should have authority to address environmental problems); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental 
Mandates and the “New (New) Federalism”:  Devolution, Revolution, or Reform,  81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 99 (1996) 
(identifying devolution of authority to state and local government as a central tenet of conservative reform efforts); 
McGarity, supra note 37, at 1497, 1506, 1511 (explaining that most schools of regulatory reform favor decentralized 
decision-making); NEWT GINGRICH, TO RENEW AMERICA 9 (1995) (arguing for devolution of power to state and 
local governments).  See also Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism:  A Critique, 50 VAND. 
L. REV. 1137 (1997) (analyzing the Unfunded Mandates concept, which played a key role in the Unfunded Mandates 
Act, a reform bill advancing both CBA and devolution).    
 136 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  
 137 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  
 138  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 606-608 (Souter, J., dissenting) (analogizing the direct/indirect distinction to 
the majority’s commercial/non-commercial distinction), at 628-630 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
commercial/non-commercial distinction is extremely malleable); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 640-43 (arguing that the 
commercial/non-commercial distinction is unworkable and ignores the “painful” history of the Lochner period).  See 
also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2211, 2244 (2005) (disagreement between the majority and dissent about 
the definition of commercial activity). 
 139 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 594 n. 9 (claiming that Lopez, unlike Lochner, “enforces . . .  the Constitution, 
not judicial policy judgments). 
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federal government of limited power.140  The majority in these cases may have understood that it 
was risking a return to Lochnerian vices by using formalist distinctions, but found the alternative 
of foregoing judicial enforcement of some constraint on the Commerce Clause authority 
unacceptable.141  So far, these decisions have not led courts to declare any environmental law 
unconstitutional.142  But the Supreme Court has just granted certiorari in three cases that offer it 
an opportunity to use its Commerce Clause jurisprudence to restrict federal regulation protecting 
wetlands.143 
The more important realm for judicial activism in the service of regulatory reform has 
involved statutory interpretation, not constitutional law.144  Thus, statutory cases like Duplex 
                                                 
 140 See U.S. Const., Art. I; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (identifying the idea that the Constitution creates a 
Federal Government with a few enumerated powers as a first principle); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 639 (Souter, J. 
dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that the Constitution withholds some powers from Congress); H. Jefferson 
Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L. REV. 651, 654-55 (1995) (noting that the majority 
assertion that the federal government’s power is limited is unsurprising and provokes no challenge from the 
dissenting Justices).    
 141 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (stating that the commercial/non-commercial distinction may create 
some “legal uncertainty,” but that the Constitution requires the Court to police the outer bounds of enumerated 
Congressional power).  
 142 See United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge 
to the Clean Water Act); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding the Endangered 
Species Act); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 
(4th Cir. 2000) (same); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same); United 
States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting Commerce Clause Challenge to work practice standards for 
asbestos under the Clean Air Act); Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to the Clean Air Act).  Cf. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 166-68 (2001) (interpreting federal jurisdiction over wetlands narrowly 
while articulating federalism concerns); United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1997) (same).   For an 
especially perceptive analysis of issues affecting the constitutionality of environmental laws under the Lopez, see 
John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 
(1998).   
 143 See Summary of Orders, 74 U.S.L.W. 3219, 3219-20 (Oct. 11, 2005).  
 144 Judicial activism is difficult to define.  See Robert E. Levy and Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial 
Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court’s Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 347 (1989) 
(pointing out that application of the term “judicial activism” is often unclear).   A working definition of statutory 
judicial activism would consider a decision activist when conventional techniques of statutory interpretation do not 
provide at least a reasonably good justification for the result and judicial views about appropriate policy seem to 
play a large role. 
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Printing Press Co. v. Deering145 and American Steel Foundries v. Tri-Cities Cent. Trades 
Council,146 furnish the most salient Lochnerian analogue to contemporary judicial activism, not 
Lochner itself.  These cases authorized injunctions of a labor-related boycott of a printing press 
and of a picket in support of striking workers at a steel foundry in the teeth of a statutory 
provision forbidding the use of injunctions in labor disputes.147  They share with Lochner not 
only a disregard for textual limits, but also solicitude toward common law rights and opposition 
to “class” legislation.148    
 Cass Sunstein, a prolific CBA supporter, has argued for a cost-benefit canon of 
construction.149  Such a canon would authorize the judiciary to interpret ambiguous statutory 
language to require CBA.  In effect, he urges judges who agree with his policy views to make the 
judges’ policy preferences determinative in many cases.  This approach emulates, to some 
degree, the Lochner-era vice of allowing prevailing economic ideologies to influence judicial 
law-making, a vice evidenced by the Court’s strained interpretation of the anti-trust laws.  But, as 
we have seen, the Supreme Court rejected industry requests for such a canon in the American 
Trucking case.150  This suggests that the modern Supreme Court, at least, has not gone as far as 
the Lochner Court in “erecting its prejudices into law.” 
                                                 
 145 254 U.S. 443, 471 (1920) (construing section of law limiting labor injunctions narrowly to allow 
judiciary to enjoin a labor action).   
 146 257 U.S. 184, 202, 205 (1921) (enjoining picketers under an anti-trust law).  
 147 See Duplex Printing, 254 U.S. at 468 n. 1; Am. Foundries, 257 U.S. at 201-202. 
 148 The Duplex Printing Court construed the prohibition on labor injunctions of the Clayton Act 
narrowly because it restricted the “general” operation of anti-trust laws by granting a “special privilege to a 
particular class.”  254 U.S. at 271.  Both cases also treat labor actions as coercive interference with a property right.  
See id. at 465-66, 478-79 (boycott coercively interferes with a property right); Am. Foundries, 257 U.S. at 202, 205 
(picketers coercively interfere with a property right). 
 149 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 487 
(1987) (suggesting that courts should presumptively read statutes to require that regulations benefits be at least 
“roughly commensurate with their costs”).  
 150 Cf.  Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678-79 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (requiring consideration of cost 
when the statute does not clearly preclude it); George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 622-24 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (requiring EPA to consider a proposed rule’s effect on gasoline price and supply under a statutory provision 
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 Still, judicial support for regulatory reform has played a role in several important 
cases.151  The dissenting Justices in the Benzene case, Industrial Union Department v. American 
Petroleum Institute,152 associated judicial support for regulatory reform with Lochnerism.153  The 
dissenters claimed that the Benzene Court struck “its own balance between the costs and benefits 
of occupational safety standards.”154  They suggested that the majority had misread the statute to 
implement its own views of proper risk management, just as the Lochner Court had misread the 
Constitution in order to implement its own economic philosophy.155  The plurality opinion 
required a finding of significant risk before regulation of toxic substances could occur under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act.156  This requirement flowed in part from sympathy toward a 
cost-benefit framework, for the plurality did not want to “give OSHA the power to impose 
                                                                                                                                                             
not mentioning costs); Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (authorizing 
the Federal Aviation Administration to consider costs to the air tourism industry in deciding how to devise a plan for 
“substantial restoration of natural quiet” in the Grand Canyon area).  
 151 See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 144, at 421 (concluding that “the Supreme Court has elevated 
economic efficiency to a level of importance not shared by Congress.”).  I am here defining regulatory reform 
primarily in terms of a concern with CBA.  Other writers have addressed the environmental tendencies of the Court 
more broadly.  See, e.g., Lin, supra note 129, at 565 (arguing that the Court’s October 2003 term continued a trend 
of gradually eroding environmental law through the use of common law causation analysis, textualism, and 
federalism); Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 
47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 708-736 (1999) (reviewing the voting records of individual Justices in environmental cases); 
Daniel A. Farber, Reflections on the Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 547, 547 (1997) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court has had little impact upon environmental law); Levy & Glicksman, supra note 144, 
at 346 (claiming that “the Supreme Court has pursued a policy far less protective of the environment than the Policy 
intended by Congress”) .  While none of these general articles ascribe Lochnerian tendencies to the Court as a 
whole, some of them mention tendencies of individual Justices that seem distinctly Lochnerian.  See Lazarus, supra, 
at 727 (stating that Justice Scalia seems concerned that environmental law “may promote governmental authority at 
the expense of individual autonomy, such as in the exercise of property rights.”)  
 152 448 U.S. 607 (1980) 
 153 Id. at 723-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 154 Id.  
 155 Id.   In context the dissenter’s reference to the majority’s “own balance,” stands in contrast to the 
balance struck by Congress.  See id. at 713 (claiming that the plurality “is more interested in the consequences of its 
decision than in discerning” Congressional intent).   And the dissenters analogize the Court’s willingness to enact its 
own views into law in “Benzene” to the Lochner majority’s use of laissez-faire philosophy.  See id. at 723-24 (citing 
Holme’s suggestion that the Lochner majority made Herbert Spencer’s Social Statistics into a governing legal 
principle). 
 156 Id. at 639-40 (finding that section 3(8) requires the Secretary to determine that a standard it issues 
is reasonable necessary to remedy “a significant risk of material health impairment).   
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enormous costs that might produce little, if any, discernible benefit.”157  Only Justice Powell, 
however, read the Occupational Safety and Health Act as requiring CBA.158  And the Supreme 
Court squarely rejected that view in the subsequent Cotton Dust case.159  The Benzene decision, 
however, pushed government agencies toward greater reliance on quantitative risk assessment, 
which, as we have seen, serves as a critical element of CBA.160  Professor McGarity has 
explained that this decision had an enormous influence on government regulation of carcinogens, 
discouraging generic cancer policy and significantly reducing the protectiveness of regulation.161  
The Court thus substantially advanced regulatory reform, and it did so with very little statutory 
support.162 
                                                 
 157 Id. at 645.  
 158 Id. at 776 (Powell, J. concurring) (concluding that the statute requires a “reasonable relationship” 
between the costs and benefits of regulation).  The dissenters apparently intended their accusation of Lochnerism to 
apply to Justice Powell, for they accused the “Court” of Lochnerism, see id. at 723-24 (dissenting opinion), not just 
the plurality, cf. 708-13 (addressing itself to the “plurality”) (dissenting opinion).    
 159 Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 507-523 (1981) (rejecting argument that costs 
of implementing OSHA toxic standards must bear a reasonable relationship to benefits).  
 160  See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 652-58 (putting a burden of proof upon the agency that would be 
difficult or impossible to meet without quantifying risk).  While the opinion is unclear about whether it in fact 
requires quantitative risk assessment, see id. at 654-55 (disclaiming any intent to impose a “mathematical 
straightjacket” while relying exclusively on examples of how to meet the Court’s requirements of demonstrating 
significant risk that quantified the probability of harm), the federal agencies have found it difficult to satisfy the 
opinion’s strictures without it.  See Thomas O. McGarity, The Story of the Benzene Case:  Judicially Imposed 
Regulatory Reform through Risk Assessment, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 165-68 (Richard J. Lazarus and 
Oliver A. Houck eds. 2005) (explaining how the Court’s decision helped destroyed generic cancer policy and led to 
reliance on case-by-case quantitative risk assessment).  Cf. Farber, supra note 151, at 552-53 (stating that the Court 
did not offer “clear leadership” on the issue of whether regulation is warranted based on unquantifiable evidence). 
 161 McGarity, supra note 160, at 165-66.  
 162 Accord Sunstein, supra note 14, at 360 n. 266  (noting that “no statutory source” supported the 
Benzene plurality’s significant risk requirement); Farber, supra note 151, at 553 n. 27 (noting that “the plurality 
opinion is quite difficult to square” with the statute’s “plain language”); Levy and Glicksman, supra note 144, at 380 
(finding “the plurality efforts to explain the result in terms of statutory language and legislative history largely 
unpersuasive.”): Richard I. Goldsmith & William C. Banks, Environmental Values, Institutional Responsibility, and 
the Supreme Court, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 25 (1983) (finding the plurality’s position “implausible on its face.”).  
Section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) requires standards that assure “to the extent 
feasible, that no employee . . . suffer material” health impairment.  See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 612 (quoting 29 U.S.C. 
§ 655(b)(5)(2000)). 
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 The Court also advanced regulatory reform substantially in Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council,163 when it upheld an expansion of EPA’s “bubble” policy allowing polluters to 
trade emissions between sources with a facility.  But this case involved a very close call from the 
standpoint of statutory construction, and offers even less support than Benzene for a charge of 
Lochnerian activism.164 
 Lower court judges, however, have sometimes actively advocated regulatory reform.  For 
example, in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,165 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit interpreted section six of the Toxic Substances Control Act166 (TSCA) as requiring CBA 
of each regulatory alternative considered.167  Section six requires EPA to regulate “to the extent 
necessary to protect adequately against . . . risk using the least burdensome requirements.”168  
Once EPA has decided to regulate under this section, it must “adequately” protect the public 
against the risks involved.  If several possible requirements adequately protect against the risk, it 
                                                 
 163 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 164 The Court has also supported “market-based” approaches to regulatory reform through its dormant 
commerce clause jurisprudence.  In a line of cases beginning with Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), 
the Court has favored interstate markets in waste disposal services over local governmental control of garbage 
disposal.  In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court struck down a New Jersey law prohibiting the importation of 
waste from other states.  Id. at 618, 628-29.  The Court rejected the argument that the claimed statutory purpose, to 
conserve local landfill space in order to adequately protect the state’s environment, justified the ban.  Id. at 625-27.  
In so doing, it chose not to rely upon precedent allowing states to ban imports of other materials presenting health 
hazards.  See id. 631-33 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (claiming that the majority had not adequately distinguished this 
precedent).  In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court also held that the dormant commerce clause prohibited 
enactment of “flow control” ordinances and fees, which local governments use to try and establish local control of 
garbage disposal.  See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (invalidating ordinance 
requiring delivery of local garbage to a local transfer station); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of the 
State of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (invalidating statute charging a larger tipping fee for waste brought from out-of-
state than is charged for waste generated within Oregon); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 
(1992) (invalidating a surcharge on hazardous waste generated outside of Alabama).  See also Fort Gratiot Sanitary 
Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (invalidating ordinance allowing counties to 
refuse waste from outside of county).  
 These cases do not appear especially activist in a Lochnerian sense, because the tradition of striking down 
discriminatory regulation has such a long lineage.  They do reflect, however, the exercise of discretion in 
determining the limits of the anti-discrimination principle in a way that favors regulatory reform. 
 165 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).  
 166 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).  
 167 See  Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1217.  
 168 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000).    
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must choose the least burdensome requirement.  It must also consider the economic 
consequences of any rule it promulgates.169  The requirement to choose the least burdensome 
measure adequately protecting the public implies that EPA must compare the costs of adequately 
protective regulatory options to each other.  Nothing in the statute, however, states that EPA 
must compare a single regulatory option’s costs to its benefits.   Indeed, in a case where only one 
regulatory option protected the public adequately, section six plainly would require adoption of 
that option, even if the costs far exceeded the benefits.170  For section six explicitly requires 
adoption of an option that adequately protects the public.  Yet, the Proof Fittings court required 
CBA of each option.     
 Even this decision, while certainly congruent with contemporary economic ideology and 
perhaps with active enactment of the judges’ views into law, may simply reflect poor 
interpretation of a complex statute.  Congress had declared in section two of TSCA that it 
intended that EPA “shall consider the . . . economic . . . impact of any action” that it “takes or 
proposes . . .”171   While even this section does not require comparison of costs to benefits or 
consideration of the costs of alternatives that do not adequately protect health, one can charitably 
interpret the decision as simply failing to adequately harmonize section two with the operative 
language in section six.  Even so, it’s hard to believe that the contemporary intellectual climate 
did not make the wooden cost-benefit interpretation chosen appear natural to the court, in spite of 
its incongruity with the specifics of the statute.  The court could easily have harmonized section 
two with section six by requiring cost effectiveness comparisons between adequate regulatory 
alternatives, without requiring any quantification of benefits. 
                                                 
 169 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c) (2000).  
 170 Furthermore, in comparing two adequate regulatory options, the statutory language rather plainly 
requires EPA to choose the least burdensome, even if the least burdensome option has the worst cost-benefit ratio.      
 171 15 U.S.C. § 2601(c) (2000).  
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 This decision had an enormous impact upon EPA’s regulation of toxic substances.  
Indeed, after this ruling EPA never again proposed to ban or seriously regulate any substance 
under TSCA section six, apparently because quantification of benefits proved so daunting. 
 Judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have 
been more overtly ideological and willing to use the Constitution to advance their ideology.172  
But the decisions evincing this ideology most clearly have not had as large an impact as 
Lochner-era labor injunction cases or Corrosion Proof Fittings.  For example, in the 
Lockout/Tagout opinion, International Union v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA)173, the D.C. Circuit held that OSHA must narrowly construe statutory provisions 
governing non-toxic workplace hazards to avoid a nondelegation difficulty.174  The court went on 
to offer a paean to CBA and to urge the agency to cure the statutory ambiguity leading to 
nondelegation concerns by adopting CBA.175  Still, the court did not require CBA176 and 
approved an agency interpretation that did not rely upon CBA in a subsequent decision.177 
 The most far reaching attempt to use the Constitution as a regulatory reform engine came 
in American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, when the District of Columbia Circuit held that Clean Air 
Act section 109’s health protection requirement ran afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.178  But, 
as we have seen, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed this decision.   
                                                 
 172 See generally Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997) (finding that ideology significantly influences this court’s decision-making).  
 173 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991).   The case is known as Lockout/Tagout, because it addressed a 
rule requiring employers to tag or lockout (i.e. temporarily disable) devices capable of injuring workers.   Id. at 1312   
 174 Id. at 1316, 1321. 
 175 Id. at 1319-1321 (majority opinion), 1326-27 (Williams, J., concurring).  
 176 Id. at 1321 (we hold only that CBA is a permissible interpretation of § 3(8)) [emphasis in the 
original].  
 177 United Auto Workers v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that the agency’s 
construction satisfied the nondelegation doctrine notwithstanding its rejection of CBA).   
 178 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), rev’d sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).     
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The cases examined here suggest that judicial activism on behalf of contemporary regulatory 
reform has greatly influenced the law (Benzene and Corrosion Proof Fittings alone justify that 
conclusion), but has proven less prevalent and gross than Lochner-era judicial activism aimed at 
labor.179  
 B.  Ideology and Natural Law Origins 
 Both CBA and the Lochner-era embrace of liberty of contract share a common natural 
law origin.180  The CBA idea stems from neoclassical elaboration of efficiency ideals derived 
from the work of Adam Smith, who posited a law of nature by which an “invisible hand” made 
the market work to the benefit of all.181  This same natural law of the invisible hand also 
supported decentralization of economic power through liberty of contract.182  Smith himself 
referred to the “right of trafficking” as a “natural” right.183 Thus, liberty of contract and CBA 
                                                 
 179 See generally Phillips, supra note 68, at 491 (noting that “most critics of Lochner era substantive 
due process agree that the doctrine assisted business while disadvantaging workers.”). 
 180 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitutional Calculus:  Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 592, 597(1985) (CBA’s “intellectual and social heritage . . lies in the classical eighteenth and 
nineteenth century economics of unfettered contracts . . . .”).   
 181 SUNSTEIN, supra note 26, at 129 (CBA is often justified on grounds of economic efficiency); 
LEONIDAS MONTES, ADAM SMITH IN CONTEXT:  A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT OF SOME CENTRAL COMPONENTS OF 
HIS THOUGHT 142-47 (2004) (discussing how Newton inspired social scientists like Smith to search for “first 
principles” governing human conduct); .  Professor Montes argues that Smith has “too readily been assimilated to 
the natural jurisprudential tradition,” because this view neglects the “humanist” aspects of Smith’s work.  MONTES, 
supra, at 147.  Assuming that Professor Montes is correct, this neglect of Smith’s humanism does not negate the 
point made here.  The neoclassical economic tradition emphasizes the mechanistic elements of Smith’s work, 
especially the Invisible Hand metaphor.  ID. at 130.  Recognizing that this emphasis distorts Smith’s thought does 
not negate the origins of neoclassical theory in Smith’s law of the Invisible Hand.  See ID. at 150-52, 160 
(acknowledging this influence).   
 182 See Balkin, supra note 67, at 179; WIECEK, supra note 47, at 82 (the elite bar of the Lochner age 
derived from Adam Smith an idea that the market “set the natural and just price for capital and labor”); Fiss, supra 
note 63, at 47 (Graham Sumner, an influential American proponent of social Darwinism, drew upon the work of 
Herbert Spencer and Adam Smith); Hovenkamp, supra note 92 at 402-407 (tracing Lochnerian views about property 
and contract back to Adam Smith). 
 183 ADAM SMITH LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 8 (R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, and P.G. Stein eds. 
1978).  Smith also posited that the right to adjudication of a breach of contract arose from a natural law of human 
behavior, namely, that a promise “naturally creates an expectation” that the promise will be fulfilled.  ID. at 12.   
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come from a natural law tradition, in the sense of a law having a basis in fundamental 
understandings of human nature.184    
 To be sure, neither the Lochner Court nor many contemporary regulatory reformers 
directly acknowledge natural law’s influence upon their views.185  But the Lochner Court’s 
discussion of bakers pursuing happiness through voluntary contracts to work long hours certainly 
echoes Smith’s description of people bettering society through specialized labor and voluntarily 
exchange.186  Similarly, CBA owes its origins to neoclassical refinement of some of Smith’s 
ideas.  An analogy between free contracts and environmental regulation justifies CBA.  CBA 
reflects a belief that government officials enacting regulation purchase environmental benefits on 
behalf of the public, much as a buyer purchases goods through a contract or other exchange.187  
The need to quantify benefits and compare them to costs flows directly from this vision of 
environmental regulation as an analogue to a contract for purchase of a good.188  And many 
observers have read Smith as teaching that such contracts, reflecting rational choices of 
consumers pursuing their own ends, end up benefiting society.189  CBA appears natural to many 
                                                 
 184 See INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 10390, 10393 
(Neil J Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds. 2001) (defining natural law as being derived from human nature and citing 
Adam Smith as an important natural law thinker); Sofer, supra note 61, at 2394 (natural law literature emphasizes an 
“analogy between discovering moral laws by reasoning and discovering the natural laws of science.”).   See 
generally HACKNEY, supra note 57, at 25 (explaining how Blackstone’s natural law philosophy embraced laissez-
faire and anticipated Adam Smith); JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY:  A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF 
KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION 212 (1929) (arguing that laissez-faire is a logical conclusion from natural law precepts). 
 185 Cf.  GILLMAN, supra note 45, at 158-59 (characterizing an “unnatural” economic advantage as one 
that is “non-market-based”).    
 186 See Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory:  Transforming Embedded Influences 
into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 839, 882-83 (1999) (describing Lochner 
as the “symbolic high point of Smithian freedom of contract”).   
 187 See Driesen, supra note 15, at 577; BAXTER, supra note 28, at 10-12.    
 188 See Driesen, supra note 15, at 577; GOWDY & O’HARA, supra note 104, at 104-108.  
 189 Cf. DiMatteo, supra note 186, at 877-882 (arguing that Smith’s notion of free contract was not 
limited to the economic efficiency model and included a concept of just contracting).  
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of its advocates, because it reflects the same sort of logic found in the natural order represented 
by contract.190      
Moreover, demands for regulatory reform reflect a broader movement toward less 
government, based upon a faith in markets owing a great debt to Adam Smith.191  Regulatory 
reform thus forms part of a broader move toward laissez-faire, even though neoclassical 
economics does not recommend the wholesale abandonment of environmental regulation.     
 Yet, many of the legal academics who embrace regulatory reform, unlike the Lochner-era 
Justices, have explicitly rejected aspects of the economic theory supporting their preferred 
reforms.  Thus, Cass Sunstein, Eric Posner, and Matthew Adler deny that aggregation of 
consumer preferences forms an adequate basis for regulation, even though aggregation of 
preferences forms the basis of the economic theory underlying CBA.192 Nevertheless, they all 
conclude that CBA is justified.193   
                                                 
 190 See James A. Dorn, The Case for Market Liberalism, Cato Institute, available at 
http://www.cato.org/dailys/01-20-04.html (Jan. 20, 2004) (describing free market liberalism as “natural”). 
 191 See McGarity, supra note 37, at 1484-1498 (discussing the commitment of various regulatory 
reform groups to less government and linking the “radical anti-interventionists’” views to Adam Smith).  
 192 See Frank & Sunstein, supra note 44, at 324 (supporting CBA but disapproving a willingness-to-
pay approach to estimating benefits); Adler & Posner, supra note 25, at 196 (rejecting reliance on “unrestricted 
preferences” as the basis for valuing costs and benefits); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 253  (stating that CBA would be 
undesirable if it lead to economic efficient outcomes based on willingness to pay).  See also McGarity, supra note 
13, at 10 (1998) (identifying Professor Sunstein as a proponent of a “softer” variety of CBA that that offered by 
“free marketers”).  
 193 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 25-26 (basing his support for CBA on “common sense informed 
by behavioral economics and cognitive psychology, rather than neoclassical economics); Adler & Posner, Welfarist 
Theory, supra note 44, at 289-302 (linking individual welfare to overall well being that Alder identifies with CBA); 
Adler & Posner, supra note 25, at 194-95 (arguing that CBA tends to advance overall well-being).  Professor 
Adler’s support for CBA is subtle and sometimes equivocal.  See Matthew D. Alder, The Positive Political Theory 
of Cost-Benefit Analysis:  A Comment on Johnston, 150 U PA. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2002) (recognizing that CBA 
may reduce overall well being); Adler, Judge Williams, supra note 44, at 271 (supporting CBA but characterizing 
his support for CBA as “more tentative” than that of Judge Williams).  Cf. Driesen, supra note 24, at 69-75 
(questioning whether Adler and Posner’s “overall well being” theory adequately supports a choice for CBA).     
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 Natural law remains at least as influential as it was during the Lochner period, but its 
influence in the courtroom has waned significantly.194  Natural law today animates the law and 
economics movement, which tends to believe regulation will prove counterproductive because it 
interferes with the natural order represented by free markets.195  But the Court, while continuing 
at times to venerate common law models, does not use natural law to justify contemporary 
deregulation.  
 In place of natural law, we find a new kind of legal historicism, which emphasizes 
positive law sources as the basis for neutrality.  Hence, textualism and originalism have become 
influential in Constitutional interpretation.196     
 C.  Attitudes Toward Legislation 
                                                 
 194 See  Mootz, supra note 61, at 311 (referring to natural law as “a curiosity outside the 
mainstream”); Soper, supra note 61, at 2403-04 (describing the unacceptability to society of having a Supreme 
Court Justice “branded” as a “believer in natural law.”). 
 195 See generally HACKNEY, supra note 57, at 25 (identifying allegiance to natural law governing 
economic relations with the view that “any attempt to intervene. . .  was necessarily doomed to failure.”); Samuel J. 
Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis:  Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-
and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1793 (2002) (“Risk tradeoff analysis began as a tool of 
deregulation.”);  Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996); RISK VERSUS RISK:  
TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener eds. 
1995); W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS:  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RISK (1992); Ralph L. 
Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANAL. 147 (1990); AARON WILDAVSKY, 
SEARCHING FOR SAFETY (Social Philosophy and Policy Center 1988); Aaron Wildavsky , Richer is Safer, 60 PUB. 
INT. 23 (1980) 
 196 See Adam Liptak, A Court Remade in Reagan Era’s Image, N.Y. TIMES, February 2, 2006, at A19 
(discussing the Court’s growing commitment to original intent and textualism); Jonathan G. O’Neall, Raoul Berger 
and the Restoration of Originalism, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 253, 281 (2001) (concluding that Raoul Berger’s originalist 
scholarship has compelled constitutional law and theory to grapple with “the originalist proposition”).  Cf. Robert 
M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 134 (2002) (finding 
that text has little impact and intent has no impact on Supreme Court decisions); Richard S. Kay, Originalist Values 
and Constitutional Interpretation, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 335, 335 (1995) (claiming that that originalism 
describes an adjudication method identified and debated only in the last twenty years).  See generally ROBERT 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990) (a polemic on behalf of 
originalism); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS:  LAW OR POLITICS? 60 (1994) 
(characterizing Justice Scalia as “one of the Court’s foremost exponents” of originalism); STEPHEN B. PRESSER, 
RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION:  RACE, RELIGION, AND ABORTION RECONSIDERED 21(1994) (pointing out that 
“virtually every” Supreme Court Justice has, “at one time or another,” invoked originalist arguments).  
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 As suggested previously, clearer and more significant parallels with Lochnerism appear 
when we look beyond the modern judiciary.  For modern regulatory reformers’ attitudes toward 
regulation closely resemble those of the Lochner-era Court. 
 1.  Favoring Neutrality 
 We have seen that the Lochner-era Court tended to view “class legislation” with 
suspicion and supported more neutral general legislation.  Indeed, in the anti-trust cases the 
Court converted class legislation into neutral legislation, by misinterpreting trust-busting laws as 
authorizing injunctions against labor as well as business.   
 Modern regulatory reformers echo this opposition to “class legislation” when they decry 
the one-sidedness of legislation favoring protection of the public’s health over the interests of 
polluters.  While they do not explicitly frame their opposition in “class legislation” terms, a 
provision like section 109 of the Clean Air Act197 takes resources from A (the polluter) and gives 
them to B (the breather) in the form of health protection.198  In doing so, the legislation corrects a 
power imbalance that makes breathers helpless in protecting their own health from pollution 
absent government intervention, a power imbalance similar to that which the New York 
legislature sought to correct in employment relations when it sought to limit bakers’ working 
hours.  Cass Sunstein refers to class legislation protecting breathers from polluters as absolutist, 
thus suggesting that one-sided legislation is irrational, even though as one of the moderate voices 
in the regulatory reform movement, he suggests that absolutism might be justified in a few case 
                                                 
 197 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000).  
 198 Section 109 requires EPA to establish standards for ambient air quality sufficient to protect public 
health.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000).  Once it does this, states must devise plans, which include binding emission 
control obligations for polluters, to meet these standards.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2000); Train v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64-68 (1975) (describing the basics of the Clean Air Act scheme).  These state standards, 
passed as part of the effort to achieve the national ambient air quality standards, force polluters to install pollution 
control devices or employ other changes that cost them money, but improve the health of those inhaling their 
emissions.    
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(such as protection of endangered species).199  The suggestion that one-sided legislation is not 
just a value choice, but an irrational act is consistent with Lochnerism.   
 Both the Lochner-era Court and modern regulatory reformers often regard one-sided 
legislation as futile and therefore arbitrary.  To justify its holding that limits on baker’s hours 
were unreasonable, the Lochner Court speculated that such limits might prove counterproductive 
in terms of their own objectives.  Specifically, the Court claimed that limits on work hours 
“might seriously cripple the ability of the laborer to support his family.”200  This argument 
resembles a favorite theme of contemporary regulatory reformers, regulation’s potential to harm 
the very people it seeks to protect.  They frequently argue that environmental, health, and safety 
regulation can make its beneficiaries ill by reducing wealth or through direct health and 
environmental risks created through responses to regulation.201   Even though Professor 
McGarity, a leading environmental scholar, has sharply questioned the richer is safer argument 
against stringent regulation,202 the Supreme Court characterized the argument as “unquestionably 
true” in American Trucking.203    
                                                 
 199 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 213-14 (2002) 
(suggesting that a rights based approach might properly apply to the Endangered Species Act); Sunstein, supra note 
195, at 1534 (contrasting balancing with absolutism); Cass R. Sunstein, From Consumer Sovereignty to Cost-Benefit 
Analysis:  An Incompletely Theorized Agreement, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB POL’Y 203, 209 (1999) (claiming that the 
absolutism characterizing 1970s legislation “makes no sense); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 300 (characterizing many 
current statutes as calling for “absolutism”).  See also Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and 
Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 742 (1999) (arguing that public hysteria unduly influences regulation); 
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:  TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 35-36 (1993) (same). 
200  Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59.  See generally Balkin, supra note 67, at 196 (referring to the argument 
that economic regulation will hurt the very people they are designed to protect as “a standard individualist 
argument.”) 
 201 See SUNSTEIN,  supra note 20, at 136-41; ROBERT HAHN ET AL., DO FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
REDUCE MORTALITY?, 6-11 (2000) (arguing that federal regulations can increase mortality); Sunstein, supra note 
195; Graham & Wiener, supra note 195; BREYER, supra note 199, at 23 (claiming that the costs of environmental 
cleanup can deprive individuals of income and lead to poor diet, heart attacks, and suicide); VISCUSI, supra note 
195; Keeney, supra note 195; WILDAVSKY, supra note 195.  
 202  See McGarity, supra note 13, at 42-49 (refuting the richer is safer idea). 
 203  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 466 (2001) (characterizing the argument that 
the “economic cost of implementing a very stringent standard might produce health losses sufficient to offset the 
health gains” from cleaning the air as “unquestionably true.”).   See also Am. Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 
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 Scholars supporting CBA have portrayed it as a neutral reform, and made claims about its 
neutrality central to their case for it.204  Professor Sunstein, for example, argues that CBA will 
encourage agencies to make some regulations stricter and others more lenient, thus suggesting 
that it has a neutral effect.205  He also argues that CBA improves priority setting, thereby 
suggesting that it does not so much weaken environmental protection as refocus it.206  In spite of 
industry’s consistent support of CBA, Professor Sunstein, along with others, argues that CBA 
reduces special interest influence over legislation.207  Professor Gilman has identified concerns 
about special interest influence as a major reason for the Court’s embrace of “general legislation” 
both during and before the Lochner period.208  Thus, both contemporary regulatory reformers 
and the Lochner-era Justices view neutral general legislation as an antidote to special interest 
influence.   
                                                                                                                                                             
826 (7th Cir. 1993) (costs of rule for medical establishment will raise costs and reduce demand for medical services, 
which may kill people); Int’l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams J. 
concurring) (arguing that costly regulation can kill more people than it saves by reducing wealth).  Cf. Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176-77 (1997) (characterizing the Endangered Species Act’s goal as avoiding “needless 
economic dislocation produced by agency officials zealously but unintelligently pursing their environmental 
objectives.”). 
 204 See Sinden, supra note 13, at 1416 (economists have touted CBA as a “politically `neutral’ means” 
of resolving policy disputes).  
 205  SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 137 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is for everyone); Sunstein, 
supra note 21, at 2265 (supporting statement that “people with diverse views” should support CBA with examples of 
CBA producing “more rapid and stringent regulation”); SUNSTEIN,  supra note 199, at 26-27 (citing examples of 
CBA causing “more rapid and stringent regulation.”). 
 206  See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1060 (2000) 
(portraying CBA as a way of improving priority setting); Sunstein, supra note 13, at  257-260 (discussing the need to 
reallocate resources to reduce inconsistency and misallocation of resources).  See also David M. Driesen, Getting 
Our Priorities Straight:  One Strand of the Regulatory Reform Debate, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10001, 
10011 (2001) (explaining that the regulatory reformers’ emphasis on improved priority setting conveys a false sense 
of neutrality); BREYER, supra note 199, at 10-23 (arguing that risk regulation suffers from poor priority setting).  Cf. 
McGarity, supra note 13, at 34 (questioning that notion that relaxing regulatory stringency helps fund more 
important health priorities); Driesen, supra at 10017-18 (questioning the link between uneven dollars per life saved, 
CBA, and priority setting).   
 207  SUNSTEIN, supra note 199, at 107; Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.  1137, 1174 (2001) (providing a theory explaining why CBA might discourage special 
interest influence). 
 208 See GILLMAN, supra note 45, at 10 (describing the standards guiding Lochner-era jurisprudence as 
hostile to legislation advancing “the special or partial interests of particular groups or classes.”) 
 
42 
 The regulatory reformers’ neutrality ideal includes an ideal of general legislation, since 
they view CBA as a broadly applicable reform.209  Mathew Adler and Eric Posner likewise 
convey support for something akin to general legislation when they argue that CBA improves 
“overall well-being.”210  By identifying overall well-being as a goal for regulation they imply 
that CBA leads to objectively desirable outcomes, thereby supporting its neutrality.  The overall 
well-being concept suggests that government officials can avoid making value choices favoring 
one interest over another.211  The legislator need not choose between protecting the public health 
and the environment and protecting industry from regulations’ burdens.212  Instead, their concept 
suggests that an abstract state exists that provides an objectively better outcome.213   Properly 
                                                 
 209 See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 270 (discussing proposals to impose CBA on agency rulemaking 
under all regulatory statutes); William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory Muddle:  The “Legislative 
Mirage” of Single Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 298 (1996) (same). 
 210  See Adler & Posner, supra note 25, at 194-95.   
 211 Indeed, Professor Adler has gone so far as to argue that “Congress doesn’t choose values, it 
chooses actions.” See Adler, supra note 12, at 120.  This suggestion is, however, quite questionable.  For example, 
the Congressional directive that EPA set air quality standards protecting public health, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000),  
takes no direct action limiting pollution.  Instead, Congress chose a value to guide EPA decisions about what levels 
of ambient air quality to demand.  The EPA decisions setting numerical air quality standards, which constitute 
actions in a legal sense, do not themselves improve air quality.  Rather, they establish goals for state air quality 
programs that impose legal requirements that mandate pollution reductions.  David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes 
versus Rules Statutes or Rules Statutes:  The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983) (harshly 
criticizing Congress for substituting establishment of abstract goals for specific actions reducing air pollution).  By 
choosing criteria for agency action rather than regulatory levels for polluters, Congress makes a value choice, while 
leaving actual action to other institutions.  See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY 
L. Q. 233, 249 (1990) (some legislators may support health-based statutes because they establish “public values 
promoting protection of public health.”)    
 212 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 199, at 113 (CBA should be contentious because it “does not take a 
stand on highly controversial questions of what government ought to do.”).  
 213 Professors Adler and Posner, however, have earned a reputation as two of the most thoughtful 
proponents of CBA because they do address issues of value, albeit in an abstract way suggestive of neutrality.  See 
Adler, supra note 12, at 144 (describing “overall welfare” as a “particular value”); Matthew D. Adler, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, Static Efficiency, and the Goals of Environmental Law, 31 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 591, 592-94 (2004) 
(explaining that the overall well-being theory involves comparison of objective values advanced or hindered by 
government regulation and that CBA’s link to overall well-being is contingent).  On the other hand, Professor Adler 
has recently rejected the idea that deontological choices could trump the consequentialism undergirding CBA, which 
might imply more rejection of legislative value choice than his first earlier articulation of his views.  Compare 
Adler, supra, at 600-601 (rejecting the idea of deontological considerations) with Adler & Posner, Distorted 
Preferences, supra note 44, at 1111 (recognizing that deontological or egalitarian considerations might justify 
rejecting welfare improving projects); Adler & Posner, supra note 25, at 196 (recognizing that deontological and 
distributional considerations may be more important the overall well-being).   
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conducted CBA, in their view, offers, in all likelihood, a neutral method for achieving an 
objectively desirable end.214   
 Some judicial support likewise exists for the idea of CBA as a kind of desirable general 
legislation, as opposed to class legislation empowering “special interests.”  In the previously 
discussed Lockout/Tagout Decision,215 the D.C. Circuit suggested that the nondelegation doctrine 
requires that statutes provide both a “floor” – a principle establishing a minimum protection level  
- and a “ceiling”- a principle limiting a regulation’s maximum stringency - to appropriately guide 
agency decisions.216  This approach suggests that statutes should assure that agencies write 
regulations that are neither too strict nor too lenient.217  The Lockout/Tagout court clearly 
indicated that CBA’s use saves the statute from any constitutional difficulty by allowing an even-
handed approach.  This ruling suggests that an approach that made a clear value choice would 
pose a constitutional problem, but that a neutral approach (CBA) would pass muster.218  The 
                                                 
 214 A key part of Adler and Posner’s theory involves a distinctive view of what constitutes properly 
conducted CBA.  See Adler & Posner, supra note 25, at 196-99 (explaining that valuation should be based on 
consumer desires rather than “unrestricted” preferences).  Cf. Driesen, supra note 24, at 69-73 (questioning whether 
their concept of desire based measurement logically leads to a preference for CBA). 
 215 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1988).  
 216 See International Union, UAW v. OSHA (Lockdown/Tagout I), 938 F.2d 1310, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (finding that the agency’s construction providing a ceiling did not suffice because it did not create a floor).  
 217 Regulatory reform proponent Cass Sunstein endorses the floors and ceilings approach to the 
nondelegation doctrine.  See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 359 (stating that the question of whether the Act sets “floors 
or ceilings” “must be answered in order to decide” upon the Clean Air Act’s constitutionality).  This shows how 
important neutrality is to regulatory reform proponents, because the notion that the nondelegation doctrine demands 
floors and ceilings is clearly wrong.  All it demands is an intelligible principle.  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361, 371-379 (1998) (discussing the liberality of the intelligible principle requirement and applying it to uphold 
sentencing guidelines).  The Court, even before American Trucking, repeatedly held that general policy guidance 
containing no definable floor or ceiling satisfies the doctrine.  See id. at 373-74 (citing cases that upheld statutes 
directing agencies to regulate as “public interest” requires or set rates that are “reasonable”).  The suggestion that 
legislation must have both floors and ceilings, rather than just one or the other, implements a policy value of 
neutrality and moderation.  A statute with a clear floor and no ceiling (or vica versa) would be one-sided, but clearly 
intellibigle.  It’s hard to imagine what, other than unconscious devotion to neutrality, would induce a knowledgeable 
administrative and constitutional law scholar like Professor Sunstein to echo, rather than correct, this gross error in 
the D.C. Circuit case law.    
 218  Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1321 (remanding to the agency to cure the nondelegation difficulty 
rather than invalidating the statute because the statute “can reasonably be read as requiring” CBA).    
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reasoning employed suggests that class legislation favoring workers at the expense of employers 
was constitutionally suspect and must be subject to some sort of constraint. 
  2.  Hyperrationality 
Modern regulatory reformers, like the Lochner-era Court, suggest that regulators should 
give compelling reasons for their decisions, rather than meet minimum requirements of bare 
rationality.219  CBA’s use of quantification leads its supporters to believe that CBA will provide 
very compelling, indeed mathematical, justifications for precise line drawing.  This belief 
undergirds the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in American Trucking Associations v. EPA.220 The court 
chided EPA for interpreting section 109 of the Clean Air Act in a way that failed to constrain the 
stringency or the laxness of potential standards.221  It then held that section 109 of the Act, as 
interpreted by EPA, failed to provide a “determinate criterion” for setting standards and therefore 
offended the nondelegation doctrine.222  This holding suggested, especially when read in 
conjunction with the earlier ruling in Lockout/Tagout, which it discussed, that CBA could 
                                                 
 219 See Adler, supra note 12; Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1528 (arguing that an agency has a 
duty to “provide a well-reasoned analytical justification for the decision reached.”); SUNSTEIN, supra note 199, at 
107 (agencies must explain how the benefits of regulation justify the cost or why the regulation is justified if they do 
not); Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Risks After ATA, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 40-42 (suggesting that the courts should 
invalidate national ambient air quality standards when the agency fails to provide a quantitative justification for the 
regulation); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 305-06 (suggesting that EPA should justify a national ambient air quality 
standard by explaining why the amount of benefits and the residual risk in the chosen standard makes it a better rule 
than at least two competing alternatives); Sunstein,  supra note 41, at 455 (analogizing OMB review to “hard look” 
judicial review).   In defending his proposal for better explanations of rules setting national ambient air quality 
standards, Professor Sunstein argues that without a “clear and (to the extent possible) quantified presentation of the 
expected environmental benefits. . .,” there can be no assurance that the agency has chosen” an optimal regulation.  
Sunstein, supra note 14, at 309.  This suggests an abandonment of review for bare rationality in favor of a demand 
for reasoning sufficient to “assure” an optimal regulation, a very demanding standard for agency explanations in 
light of the scientific uncertainty bedeviling risk regulation.  Cf. id. at 306 (demanding that agencies acknowledge 
uncertainties).   
 220 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d sub. nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 
(2001). 
 221 Id. at 1036-37 (reviewing EPA’s approach and characterizing it as leaving EPA free to “pick any 
point between zero and hair below the concentrations yielding London’s Killer Fog.”) 
 222 Id. at 1034-38 (pointing out that “EPA lacks . . . any determinate criterion for drawing lines” and 
concluding that EPA offers no “intelligible principle,” as required by the nondelegation doctrine).  
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provide this determinate principle, if allowed by Congress.223  Thus, the image of CBA providing 
a neutral algorithm for determining standards informed the court’s judgment that the Clean Air 
Act violated the nondelegation doctrine for want of a determinate principle. 
The reasoning that the Lochner-era Court used to strike down economic legislation as 
unreasonable under the due process clause closely resembles the reasoning CBA advocates use 
to urge their favorite reform upon the polity.  This similarity was strikingly evident in Professor 
Tribe’s American Trucking brief.  Professor Tribe argued that administrative decision-making 
without consideration of cost was unreasonable in order to support a request for a presumption 
that Congress intends to mandate the consideration of cost, absent a clear contrary statement in 
the statute.224  Industry and scholars supporting its position have employed similar arguments 
about the unreasonableness of alternatives to CBA in seeking to persuade Congress to enact cost-
benefit statutes.       
For example, both the Lochner-era Court and regulatory reformers frequently use 
difficulties in justifying precise line drawing to question regulation’s rationality.  Thus, as we 
have seen, the Lochner Court called the conclusion that 10 hours of work does not endanger 
                                                 
 223 In American Trucking, the court remanded to EPA to allow that agency to construct an intelligible 
principle saving the statute from being struck down.  Id. at 1038 (remanding to offer EPA “an opportunity to extract 
a determinate standard on its own.”).  It then stated that it had mentioned cost-benefit analysis as a possible 
intelligible principal in Lockout/Tagout I.  Id.   Since American Trucking equates an intelligible principle with a 
“determinate standard,” id. (remanding to write a “determinate standard”), this effectively means that the court has 
mentioned CBA as a means of establishing a “determinate standard.”  In fact, however, the court did more than just 
mention CBA in Lockout/Tagout I.  It devoted several pages to arguing that the OSH Act permitted CBA and that 
CBA was desirable.  International Union, UAW v. OSHA (Lockout/Tagout I), 938 F.2d 1310, 1317-21 (D.C. Cir. 
1991).  It then clearly indicated that CBA would cure the nondelegation difficulty it found.  Id. at 1321.  Reading the 
two cases together strongly suggests that the court believes that CBA provides a determinate principle satisfying 
even its version of the nondelegation doctrine.  Accord Schroeder, supra note 10, at 330. 
 The American Trucking Court, while willing to endorse CBA as a general cure for problem of an 
indeterminate principle, had to rule CBA out as a means of solving the nondelegation problem it saw in section 109.  
For it recognized that its prior decisions had read section 109 as “barring EPA from considering” costs.  American 
Trucking, 175 F.2d at 1038. 
 224 See Brief of General Electric as Amicus Curiae in Support of Cross-Petitioners at 22, Whitman v. 
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1426) (hereinafter GE Brief) (agencies must consider costs in 
order for their decisions to “qualify as ‘reasoned’”).  
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health, but 10 and a half hours does “entirely arbitrary”.225  And in Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital226 the Court found it impossible to understand how a board charged with defining a 
minimum wage adequate to provide for womens’ welfare could use such a general criterion to 
come up with a precise number, and therefore assumed that the board must have “brought 
different factors into the problem” than those mentioned in the governing statute.227  Professor 
Tribe’s General Electric Brief similarly claimed that implementing a directive to protect public 
health is impossible because scientific information cannot “definitively determine” a precise 
numerical air quality standard.228  EPA therefore must have considered a statutorily extraneous 
factor, namely cost, argued General Electric.229  Both the Lochner-era Court and the modern 
regulatory reformers tend to assume that something improper, or at least extra-statutory, must be 
going on when a convincing explanation for a numerical regulatory standard does not appear.  
Both embrace an expansive view of arbitrary regulation as including any regulation lacking a 
very convincing explanation for very difficult judgments about precise line drawing.   
Both the Lochner-era Court and modern regulatory reformers often treat a failure to 
weigh all pros and cons as unreasonable.  Thus, the Adkins Court cited an administrative 
agency’s failure to consider the cost to an employer of providing a minimum wage as a reason to 
find a minimum wage law arbitrary.230  CBA advocates’ arguments challenging the rationality of 
1970s environmental legislation because of its alleged failure to consider cost echoes the 
                                                 
225 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62. 
226 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) 
 227 Id. at 556-57.  
 228 GE Brief at 17.  Accord Brief for Cross Petitioners, at 43-45, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 
531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1426) 
 229 GE Brief at 18 (EPA considers factors “such as costs” in an “unreviewable back-door fashion”)  
230 See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 557 (failure to consider cost to employer of providing a minimum wage).  
Contra Parrish, 300 U.S. at 397 (rejecting this approach). 
 
47 
approach to reasonableness review in the Lochner-era substantive due process cases.  Both tend 
to treat policy choices that do not weigh costs and benefits as irrational.231 
D.  CBA:  Then and Now 
We have seen that the Lochner-era Court, like modern regulatory reformers, relied 
heavily on CBA.  Justice Holmes’ accusation that the Lochner Court sought to pursue a laissez-
faire vision might lead one to suppose that modern regulatory reformers are much less extreme 
than the Lochner Court.  For most modern regulatory reformers do not seek to repeal health and 
environmental regulation outright, they simply wish to subject it to a cost-benefit test.232  This 
reflects modern economic theories’ endorsement of regulation of “externalities,” problems that 
contracting parties may create for third parties that are not internalized in prices.233   
But the parallel between the Lochner Court and the modern neoclassical position is more 
extensive than the Holmes dissent suggests.  Professor Hovenkamp has explained that the 
Lochner Court permitted regulation of businesses where externalities exist.234  And, as we saw in 
Part II, the Court generally subjected much of this regulation to something resembling a cost-
benefit test.   
It might seem surprising that modern regulatory reform bears any resemblance to 
Lochnerism.  But reflection suggests a simple reason for the rough similarity.  For all its 
sophistication, modern regulatory reform forms part of a broad political and intellectual 
                                                 
 231  See GE Brief at 22 (suggesting that decisions reached without consideration of cost are generally 
unreasoned); Adler, supra note 12, at111 (assuming that a requirement that all government bodies be rational “might 
in some contexts reduce to a CBA requirement”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, supra note 199, at 207 (equating CBA with 
“sense and rationality”).  Cf. Int’l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (associating CBA 
with “reasonableness”).  
 232 See McGarity, supra note 37, at 1492-95, 1505 (explaining that both “free marketers” and 
“modern mugwumps” favor CBA).  
 233 See Driesen, supra note 15, at 553 (explaining the externality-based rationale for regulation).  
 234 See Hovenkamp, supra note 92, at 440-446 (explaining how the classical economic concept of 
externalities explains seeming anomalies in the case law).    
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movement that venerates free markets and distrusts government, even though some of the more 
thoughtful regulatory reformers part company with this broader agenda and set of beliefs in some 
respects.235  It is not too surprising that contemporary attitudes toward legislation and regulation 
would resemble, to some extent, those of powerful adherents of an earlier anti-regulatory 
movement.236  And those attitudes might tend to influence legal practice and thinking.  The next 
section explores this similarity’s significance for modern regulatory reform. 
IV.  Implications for the Regulatory Reform Debate 
 While the Lochner period jurisprudence still has a poor reputation with most scholars and 
with the sitting Justices, some academics have defended it.237  The existence of some parallels 
between modern regulatory reform and Lochnerism condemns neither.  But the parallelism, even 
with all of its limits, gives us a broader view of regulatory reform, and therefore leads to new 
insights that should form part of the regulatory reform debate. 
 A.  Hyper-rationalism  
 Some concerns about hyper-rationalism have formed part of the regulatory reform debate.  
One can view oft-expressed concerns that “soft variables” (such as difficult to quantify 
environmental values) will receive short shrift under CBA as a concern about hyper-
                                                 
 235 See generally Shaman, supra note 61, at 502 (noting that the “law and economics movement has 
spawned a new generation of free market adherents who favor as little economic regulation as possible.”).  
 236 See id. at 502-506 (explaining how some adherents of the law and economics movement have 
endorsed Lochnerism in one form or another).  See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:  The New 
Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 464 (1998) (arguing that Lochner’s 
“economic vision” undergirds arguments favoring the superiority of common law contract and property regimes for 
digital works).     
 237 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
(1985); BERNARD SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 274-282 (1980) (defending protection of 
economic rights from government regulation).  
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rationalism.238  We need more discussion of rationality’s limits and the relationship between 
rationality and CBA.  Is it really possible to comprehensively consider everything and still 
produce a non-arbitrary reason for a particular action?  How can an agency non-arbitrarily give 
substantial weight to non-quantifiable variables when operating in a cost-benefit framework?  
Does CBA provide a mechanism to generate convincing explanations for precise line drawing?  
Or instead, will CBA create an illusion that convincing explanations are possible without 
delivering a mechanism, thereby leading to results like that found in Adkins and in the D.C. 
Circuit’s American Trucking opinion, where the failure to provide a strong justification for a 
particular number in a regulation led to invalidation?239  Finally, does CBA advance rationality 
or does it hide its limits in poorly reasoned decisions about cost-benefit methodology?240  This 
Article cannot answer these questions, but the analogy with Lochnerism reveals the role of 
demands for heightened rationality and therefore highlights the importance of these questions.   
Just as Lochnerian attitudes led to rather strict scrutiny of economic legislation, Lochnerian 
regulatory reform ideas may encourage heightened scrutiny of administrative agency 
regulations,241 which raises a host of issues worthy of more attention.   
 B.  Neutral Law and Administrative Agencies 
 The insight that Lochnerism and regulatory reform share a set of attitudes toward 
government regulation suggests questions about the role of neutrality ideals in regulatory reform.  
                                                 
 238 See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Rethinking Rationality:  The Role of Regulatory Analysis in 
the Federal Bureaucracy (1991); Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 Pub. Admin. Rev. 
78 (1959). 
 239 Driesen, supra note 24, at 89-91 (arguing that no reasoning supporting a numerical standard can 
be precise); Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1497, 1537 (2002) (proposing limited judicial review of CBA).  
 240 See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless:  Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2002) (characterizing the techniques used to monetize 
benefits as “a little crazy”).  
 241 See Driesen, supra note 15, at 596-599 (explaining how CBA requirements can lead to demanding 
judicial review).  
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Should regulatory analysis aid implementation of legislative value choices or implement instead 
a natural law vision of ideal regulation?  Does the very idea of a legislative value choice imply 
that agencies may not engage in open-ended consideration of all costs and benefits of proposed 
actions?  This subsection explores some of these issues.   
 Regulatory reformers want CBA to guide administrative agency decisions, since agencies 
make many important decisions about how much environmental, health, and safety protection to 
offer.242  This poses a problem in terms of the ideal of neutral origins for law.  Just as we expect 
judicial decisions adjudicating constitutional law claims to reflect some reasonable interpretation 
of the Constitution, we expect administrative decisions to reflect reasonable interpretations of 
relevant statutes.243  CBA’s natural law origins in economic theory may make it legitimate in the 
eyes of some academics, but a court or administrative body’s legitimacy hinges on a narrower 
sense of neutrality.  These bodies must, insofar as possible, make decisions having detectable 
origins in the decisions of a superior positivist authority, namely the legislature.  
 While some commentators seem to assume that CBA is compatible with following a 
variety of legislative directions, it is not clear that this is so.  American Trucking suggests that 
CBA can be incompatible with the principle that administrative agencies accept Congressional 
value choices.  The American Trucking Court rejected the consideration of cost in section 109, 
because Congress directed EPA to protect public health.244  If EPA were to decline to protect 
                                                 
 242 See id.  
 243 See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (authorizing courts to 
reverse administrative interpretations only when contrary to specific Congressional intent or unreasonable).  
 244 Id.  
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public health, because it believed that the costs of protecting public health outweighed the 
benefits, it would clearly have violated the mandate to protect public health.245 
 Indeed, when Congress lists factors that an agency must consider in setting standards, 
such as the factor of public health, considering other factors violates the law.246  In Department 
of Transportation v. Citizens for Overton Park, the Department of Transportation argued that it 
should be able to employ CBA in deciding whether to put a highway through a state park.247  But 
the governing statute required the agency to route highways around parks if feasible.248  The 
Supreme Court held that broad consideration of CBA involved a failure to follow the 
Congressional policy, and therefore constituted arbitrary and capricious rulemaking.249   
Similarly, Congressional directives to realize the maximum feasible reductions of 
pollution, which are found in numerous statutory provisions,250 contemplate the consideration of 
cost, but they do not authorize CBA.251   Such provisions arguably require that the agency 
                                                 
245   Determining what ambient air quality standard adequately protects public health does present line 
drawing problems, of course.  But the D.C. Circuit’s suggestion in American Trucking that the health protection 
directive in section 109 offers no guidance at all, Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1036-37 (D.C. Cir. 
1999), overruled, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), conflicts with the teaching of that court’s 
own precedent.  The D.C. Circuit has held that EPA acted arbitrarily when it allowed level pollution that it knew 
produced serious documented health problems.  See Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(remanding because the agency failed to explain why it was not protecting thousands of asthmatics from atypical 
physical affects associated with bursts of high sulfur dioxide concentrations).  Allowing the agency to consider the 
cost impacts would authorize relaxing standards even when they failed to protect against serious public health 
damage in areas of little or no uncertainty.     
 246  See Department of Transportation v. Citizens for Overton Park, 401 U.S.  402 (1971). 
 247  Id. at 411-12. 
 248  Id. at 411. 
 249  See id. at 413, 415-416, 420 (prohibiting wide ranging balancing and requiring agency decisions to 
be based on “relevant factors.”).  See also Am. Textile Ass’n v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981) (stating that 
CBA is not required when feasibility analysis is); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256-265 (1976) (agency 
may not consider cost and feasibility when the statute does not mention these considerations as relevant factors). 
 250  See, e.g. 16 U.S.C. § 1455b(g)(5) (2000); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1316(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7411(a)(1), 7412(d), 7475(a)(4), 7503(a)(2) (2000).  See generally Driesen, supra note 24, at 20-21 (giving 
examples of provisions generally conforming to the feasibility principle). 
 251  See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 509 (CBA is not required when feasibility analysis is). 
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maximize feasible reductions.252  If EPA gave up a feasible reduction, presumably one that the 
regulated companies could produce without closing down, because it thought that the costs of 
maximum feasible reductions outweighed the benefits, it may have violated a statute that 
embodies such a mandate.253   
 An agency, however, should consider CBA when the governing statute requires it to 
weigh costs against benefits or to achieve a particular relationship between costs and benefits 
(e.g. benefits should not greatly outweigh costs).254  It should do so because CBA produces 
relevant information for its decision.   
 In general, Overton Park suggests that agencies should conduct directly targeted analysis, 
i.e., analysis designed to illuminate only the factors governing statutory provisions make 
relevant.  Conducting a broader analysis can only conform to Overton Park if the broader 
analysis is not considered.  And it makes no sense to waste time and money on an analysis that 
cannot be considered, when a more focused intensive analysis of relevant factors is an available 
alternative.255   
                                                 
 252 Driesen, supra note 24, at 20-22.  See, e.g., Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 
461, 476-77 (2004) (describing requirement that states implement “Best Available Control Technology” 
requirements under the Clean Air Act as anticipating the most stringent economically available alternative); Nat’l 
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 287 F. 3d 1130, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating that emission standards for diesel engines 
must “reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3) (2000); Am. 
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that the Clean Air Act requires the greatest 
reduction achievable through reformulation of gasoline). 
 253 See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 509 (CBA is not required when maximum feasible protection from 
material health impairment is required).  
 254 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.  § 701a (2000) (authorizing construction of flood control projects generating 
benefits exceeding costs).  The text of the best practicable control technology provisions in the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act appears to authorize a cost-benefit test.  See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(B), 1314(b)(1)(B) 
(2000).  But reviewing courts have concluded, based largely on legislative history, that Congress did not intend to 
compare the costs of control to the monetized benefits associated with improved water quality.  See Ass’n of Pac. 
Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 1980).   See also Driesen, supra note 24, at 23-24 (reviewing the case 
law). 
 255 See id. at 48-54 (explaining why CBA is more complicated than feasibility analysis). 
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 The argument that agencies should “consider” CBA in some indeterminate matter, with 
no reference to the content of statutes governing agencies, suggests a rejection of a positivist rule 
of law in favor of natural law.  For the heart of a positivist rule of law, at least in the 
administrative law area, involves agencies implementing Congressional views about wise policy 
and conducting analysis that targets the considerations Congress made relevant through the value 
choices in the implementing legislation. 
 Some of the legal scholars supporting regulatory reform, however, have a model of 
expert decision-making in mind, rather than natural law.256  This would place them in the 
company of progressive opponents of Lochnerism.257  Still, their view remains in some tension 
with the notion of legislative value choice that emerged in the post-Lochner era.  The insight that 
regulatory reformers’ position undermines a positivist view of law leads to some new questions 
even for these “modern mugwumps.”258  Can one have expert decision-making without value 
choices?  If there must be value choices, what is the justification for leaving them in the hands of 
experts?259   
 Accepting a positivist approach would not necessarily eliminate all arguments for CBA.  
It would, however, eliminate the many arguments that focus on CBA’s natural virtues.  A 
positivist analysis would only endorse CBA for legislative provisions embodying efficiency 
values.  But the Congresses of the 1970s, which enacted much of the corpus of modern 
environmental, health, and safety statutes was not especially even-handed, and arguably showed 
                                                 
 256 See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 199, at 67 (arguing for expert rulemaking insulated from political 
pressures).  
 257 I am grateful to David Bernstein for pointing this out.    
 258  See McGarity, supra, note 37, at 1498-1500 (characterizing Cass Sunstein and other moderate 
regulatory reformers as “modern mugwumps”). 
 259          See generally Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy:  A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on 
Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2006). 
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little concern with economic efficiency.260  Thus, heeding the Lochner-era rejection of natural 
law would bring a significant change in the regulatory reform debate, which has been much more 
concerned with normative efficacy than interpretive plausibility.             
 The suggestion that Congress historically has not been much concerned with efficiency  
leads to the question of whether Congress should require cost-benefit balancing.  Should elected 
representatives legislate with Lochnerian neutrality?                   
 C.  Legislation and Value Choice  
Legislators create policy, rather than interpret others= policies.261 In the environmental 
area, a prevalent economic dynamic makes remedial legislation especially appropriate. 262  
Environmental problems do not remain static, but tend to get worse over time, because of the 
fundamental tendencies of people to multiply and increase consumption, absent some 
countervailing force.263  As consumption grows, makers of goods and services amass wealth that 
enables them to weaken and sometimes fend off government efforts to limit pollution and natural 
resource destruction.264  This tendency means that environmental law probably should not be 
neutral; rather it should countervail environmentally destructive tendencies in unregulated 
                                                 
 260 See Sinden, supra note 13, at 1418 (describing lawmakers of the 1960s and 1970s as “highly 
skeptical of CBA”); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:  LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 363-
64 (4th ed. 2003) (describing the “climate” in 1970s Washington as “inhospitable” to CBA); Howard Latin, Ideal 
Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:  Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning Regulatory Reforms, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1283-84 (1985) (Congress emphasized “prompt injury prevention over the need for an 
optimal balance between regulatory benefits and costs.”).  
 261 See Norman Silber and Geoffrey Miller, Toward “Neutral Principles” in the Law:  Selections 
from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 929 (1993) (Wechsler states that courts only 
apply law, but suggests that Congress creates it).
  
 262 See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2003).  See also 
Symposium:  Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law and Static Efficiency, 31 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 501-
616 (2004).  
 263 See David M. Driesen & Charles Hall, Efficiency, Economic Dynamics, and Climate Change, 31 
DIGEST 1, 8-9 (2005).  
 264 David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law, 31 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
501, 512-13 (2004).    
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markets.  And it must be designed to function well under substantial monied pressure to become 
ineffective.265  Powerful corporations play an important role today as they did during the time of 
Lochner.266   
As a general matter, legislative value choice is perfectly appropriate.  It is fine for a 
legislative body to choose between peace and war, between bilingual and English only 
education, between welfare and workfare, between a graduated income tax and a flat tax, 
between high tariffs and free trade.267  We elect legislatures precisely to establish non-neutral 
principles reflecting the value choices of the representatives or their constituents.     
While it may be appropriate for legislatures to make stark black and white choices, surely 
legislatures may properly make more nuanced judgments about how to balance competing policy 
considerations.  It may decide to lock the prison doors and throw away the keys in response to 
violent criminal offenses committed by adults of sound mind, but to authorize less punitive 
treatment for juveniles or the insane.268  Congress may decide to protect some land as wilderness, 
but permit limited logging on other lands.269   
Because loss of health disables the victim from enjoying much of what life has to offer 
and from contributing to society, giving primacy to preventing involuntary risks to health is a 
                                                 
 265 See  Latin, supra, note 260, at 1270-71, 1293-96 (discussing the strategic behavior of regulated 
industries and environmentalists).    
 266 See Sinden, supra note 13, at 1436-1442 (discussing the corporate role in creating a power 
imbalance in the design and implementation of environmental regulation).  
 267 Cf. Silber & Miller, supra note 261, at 929 (quoting Wechsler as disagreeing with Ronald 
Reagan=s decision to Atake benefits out of the hides of the poor and grant larger privileges to the wealthy,@ but 
considering this Alegitimate@).  
 268 See, e.g., Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (2000) (mandating 
procedures for the removal of juveniles form the ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of prior 
criminal conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) 
(an individual may be acquitted of criminal charges because of insanity and may be committed to a mental 
institution to protect him and society from potential dangerousness). 
 269 See National Forest System Land and Resource Management Plans, 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000) 
(permitting logging in certain areas previously listed as wilderness).   
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defensible value choice.270  Since the environment provides vital amenities and a life support 
system,271 giving primacy to protecting the environment itself also is defensible. 
Yet, in their details many environmental statutes embody some Congressional balancing 
of competing considerations.  I have argued elsewhere, for example, that the feasibility principle, 
which animates numerous statutory provisions, reflects a Congressional decision to give primacy 
to protecting health and the environment, except where doing so is likely to lead to widespread 
plant closures producing significant unemployment.272  This principle may reflect a judgment 
that firms should not subject people to involuntarily incurred health risks, except when plant 
closures may create comparable risks of potentially debilitating unemployment.273  This 
judgment offers a nuanced approach that requires an agency to balance competing concerns, but 
does not pretend that quantification can avoid the need for a value judgment.274    
These examples illustrate several things.  Legislation should not remain neutral on the 
issues it addresses.  It is legitimate for legislation to be very one-sided.  Even if it desirable for 
legislation to be nuanced, the legislature may appropriately make value choices, rather than 
delegate key value choices to agencies.   
Legislatures may choose economic efficiency as a value for legislation (if one believes 
that efficiency is a value).275 Such a value choice would appropriately lead to CBA.  But 
                                                 
 270 See Driesen, supra note 24, at 38-39 (explaining how injury to health can devastate individuals); 
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271  See Brett Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 
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 274 Id. at 34-41. 
 275 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J.  LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).  
 
57 
justification of a cost-benefit criterion requires the identification and defense of a value choice, a 
task avoided when scholars treat CBA’s neutrality as itself an argument for its adoption. 
The legitimacy of value choices also implies the legitimacy of “class legislation,” defined 
as legislation that empowers some groups at the expense of others.  Social security advances the 
interests of the old at the expense of the young.  Similarly, the Clean Air Act advances the 
interests of breathers at the expense of the interests of industry.   This favoritism does not cast 
doubt on the legitimacy of the legislation, for legislative value choices must, in effect, favor 
some groups over others.  As a result, the regulatory reformers’ argument that CBA reduces the 
influence of “special interests” should not count as a good argument for CBA.  There is nothing 
wrong with legislation that advances some interests at the expense of others.  That is what 
legislation is for. 
The analysis offered above suggests that appeals to CBA’s neutrality provide scant 
justification for it.  Legislation properly involves value choices.   
Conclusion 
The debate about the future of environmental policy should address value choices and the 
nature of the society we live in.  Unfortunately, the image of CBA as a neutral rationalizing 
reform akin to “general legislation” has appealed to the technocratic instincts of academics and 
policy makers, but proven unhelpful in clarifying what value choices Congress should make in 
shaping environmental policy.   The analogy between Lochnerism and modern regulatory 
reform, while incomplete, highlights the limits of neutral rubrics as a guide to policy.      
 
